From the Editors – The «Priority of Truth» means the «Priority of the Person» (A.M.W.)

The 20th century, marked on the one hand by an appalling contempt for the human being and by numerous testimonies to his greatness on the other, was a time of challenge for philosophy. Yet during that time of trial of humanity, “filled to its upper limit or weakened to its lowest”¹ and vacillating “between heroism and bestiality,”² Polish philosophy would stand by man. For centuries oriented towards practical issues rather than purely speculative ones, in the 20th century it produced a pleiad of ethicists who were an important voice in the controversy about man and morality and whose views had weight that was significant to culture. Thanks to the works of Roman Ingarden, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Maria Ossowska, Henryk Elzenberg, Jacek Woroniecki, Konstanty Michalski, Karol Wojtyła, Tadeusz Ślipko and Józef Tischner Polish humanistic reflection received an ethical foundation which, while methodologically and philosophically varied, was strong in its axiological depth. The philosophical output of Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń (1931-2010), an inherent part of 20th century ethics, occupies a prominent position in this panorama of the work of Polish thinkers.

Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń was always proud to point to his intellectual genealogy as that of a student of Karol Wojtyła’s. It was from Wojtyła that he learnt to see a human being as a human person, and to perceive the human as well as transcendent reality through the category of person and his actually existing inner subjectivity, of the irreducible in man. He would acknowledge: “I believe it was Karol Wojtyła who «infected» the Lublin philosophical milieu with his personalism and I believe he continues to perturb it with it in a healthy way.”³ Precisely the same can be said about Tadeusz Styczeń’s ethics: due to its inherent personalism it does not cease to be both inspiring and perturbing.

However, the «content» of personalism is by no means determined by finding the key to ethics in an insight into the dignity of the human person. Needless to say, the insight in question was already familiar to Socrates and to Sophocles’s Antigone, and it is generally acknowledged by Christianity as well as by secular humanism. Thus Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń became a participant in the modern-day controversy about personalism. While exploring what is due to a human person from another, he would point that the key to this issue is the person’s capacity to know the truth about himself as person. The thesis that freedom consists in self-determination of the human subject in truth results in questioning the conceptions in which the human person is approached as creating the truth about himself, either individually or collectively, and ultimately leads to their rejection. Styczeń was aware that personalist ethics may become absolutist as well as relativist. Moreover, he did not consider the emergence of these two options in anthropology and ethics or their clash in the field of Christian moral theology as a merely theoretical problem, since theoretical conceptions, much as they are interesting in themselves, bear practical significance. Thus Father Styczeń’s philosophy of the human person as witness and depositary to truth would frequently be considered as perturbing.

His view that the greatness of a human being lies in the acceptance of the duty to affirm truth for the sake of truth only also sheds light on the relation between philosophy and life. It would certainly be a truism to say that all the problems considered by ethics are practical issues of life. It is popular knowledge that moral problems spring from the question: How should one live? Moreover, Father Styczeń’s frame of ethics as the theory of the normative power of truth demonstrates that the humanity of man lies precisely in his power of theoretical investigation, in his pursuit of truth and in its recognition. Styczeń observes that truth lies at the root of the human person, and at this point he would probably add that the righteous one lives by truth. Indeed, a closer inspection of the human being as capable of recognizing truth and simultaneously of binding himself with it in a free act enables one to see the inherent junction between the theoretical reason and the practical one, between philosophy and life, between logos and ethos.

For the sake of the integrity and rectitude of its discourse, the ethical reflection which originates from the concern about the human in man and about the growth of the humanity of the person, enabling him to match the truth about himself, must necessarily turn to metaethical problems. Thus, it must see a connection between ethics and metaphysics, as well as the possibility – or even a necessity – of the encounter between ethics and Revelation. Tadeusz Styczeń’s ethical works, written in the space of fifty years, demonstrate an impressive effort to engage in a critical exchange with modernity. The author of the essay Freedom in Truth would paraphrase Simone Weil’s well known phrase about justice, saying that truth is “a fugitive from the camp of the victors,” yet in his writings one will not find even the slightest trace of diversion from the pursuit to know truth, to say it aloud and defend it.

He cherished genuine admiration for the witnesses of truth, persons considered as introducing discomfort, whether among a majority, as Socrates did in Athens, or among oppressors, as it was the case with the proverbial Kowalski in the
totalitarian regime in Poland under communism. Father Styczeń would not hesitate
to speak himself as a witness. It was precisely in this sense that he conceived of
«academia,» which was the love of his life. Always concerned about its inde−
pendence, he by no means considered it a place for the fugitives from the «polis»;
on the contrary, he considered it a realm where great service is being done to
the community, both national and international, and as such transgressing the
political borders. This service is accomplished, according to Styczeń, by means
of philosophical reflection on the moral foundation of the reborn Poland and of
the unifying Europe. The ethics of Tadeusz Styczeń is a political ethics in the
noblest sense of this term, as it argues for the primacy of conscience in politics
and for the primacy of truth over power.

Soon after martial law was declared in Poland in 1981, Father Styczeń wrote a letter
to General Wojciech Jaruzelski, protesting against acts of the breaking of con−
sciences due to the coercion and the pressure exerted on particular individuals
to sign false declarations of loyalty to the regime, in which those bound by them
apparently promised to abandon their efforts to undermine the communist sys−
tem. As an ethicist Styczeń could not remain indifferent to the question of the
political order, as well as to the hope to transform it which originated together
with the Solidarity movement, uniting millions of Poles in years 1980-1981. In
December 1981 the Solidarity was brutally supressed by the declaration of mar−
tial law all over the country, but in his letter to General Jaruzelski Father Styczeń
would not discuss questions of the political order, but he wrote about human
persons being greatly harmed. The measure of justice in a state, indeed the measure
of the goodness of its political order, is respect for the human person as a being
who is free in truth. The test case for state injustice is a situation of attack by the
state on the person’s dignity, when truth becomes an object of manipulation on
the part of the state and is “politically distributed,” according to decision of its
representatives.

When, after year 1989, a controversy about democracy emerged in Poland, Fa−
ther Styczeń considered it a continuation of the controversy about man. If the
state is to be truly righteous and in this sense democratic (according to the com−
mon view after the tragic consequences of the totalitarian tyranny), it must be
simultaneously jurisprudent and as such respect the personal dignity of each and
every one of its citizens. A democratically imposed limitation of the inherent
rights of any social group, or even an attempt to question them, sabotages de−
mocracy from within. Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń is also known to have formulated
the compact rule for a righteous state, “the unborn is the measure of democra−
cy,” which grants him a prominent place in the history of European humanism.
Needless to say, this formulation was deeply perturbing. Yet when he was en−
gaged in a controversy as an ethicist, the reason was by no means making a sen−
sation. Neither did he refer to his religious views, while they might have had
their gravity, but in keeping faithfully with the insight into the truth about the
human being and about the relation of the state to this truth, he would conclude
by saying that the state will not save itself as the community of all its citizens
unless it saves each and every one of them, in particular those who are the weak−
est among them. A just and righteous state must not use the majesty of law in
order to distribute human life.
In 1991, Father Styczeń, who was then the Director of the John Paul II Institute at the Catholic University of Lublin, invited the senators of the Republic of Poland to a debate on the axiological foundations of human life protection by state law. He connected being an ethicist to initiating public discourse, because—as he used to say—the truth is one, and cannot be divided into «academic» and «parliamentary». Consequently, he believed, unless democracy is considered a political order based on cognitive relativism, it demands an honest reflection, engaging various milieus. Father Styczeń was deeply convinced that democracy can derive its power from the culture of reflection. He did not want to convert anybody to “his truth,” but he was concerned about creating the conditions in which each person—by way of pursuit accomplished in solidarity with others—will be able to find common values with them. Thus he was happy when one of the senators, without having changed his own views, which were dramatically different from those cherished by Father Styczeń, declared that the debate he had initiated was most needed, since it concerned issues which a human person, a rational being, is not allowed to abandon.

Yet to Father Styczeń ethics did not exhaust itself in initiating debates, and not infrequently would he speak out publicly as a witness, as well as an accuser. He paid his deep respect to King Baudouin of Belgium for his «royal no» to the new law reducing the protection of human life in his country. The ethicist from Lublin worked on developing his ideas, he published books and articles, organized symposia and presented lectures—in all of it he was serving the purpose to develop the «culture of life.» In year 2000, he refused to accept a high decoration he was awarded by the President of the Republic of Poland, who by his decisions made a step backwards from the law on the legal protection of human life, which had been passed by Polish Parliament. This refusal was Father Styczeń’s own «royal no,» expressing the sovereignty of his conscience.

The current volume of Ethos was born from gratitude we feel towards our Professor and Master, who was Head of the Department of Ethics, Founder and long-standing Director of the John Paul II Institute at the Catholic University of Lublin, as well as long-term Editor-in-Chief of our quarterly. During the years of our cooperation with Father Professor Tadeusz Styczeń we continually learnt from him that to live means to thank.

Gratitude towards a thinker is best expressed in various forms of contact with his thought. Thus in the current volume we present selected articles by Father Styczeń, motivated by the conviction, which he cherished so deeply, that «the whole can be seen in the fragment.»

A proven and fruitful form of contact with philosophical reflection is its critical exploration and interpretation. Thus some of the articles included in the current volume offer studies of various aspects of the philosophy of Tadeusz Styczeń. It is the first so wide-ranging monograph of the ethical output of the personalist from Lublin. While it by no means exhausts the richness and depth of his original philosophical insights, developed by him throughout his active years, it in a way orders the thematic fields he explored in his works, and presents his most important ideas. Moreover, some authors continue a debate with the views of their Master and Friend, which evidences their truly philosophical passion of the pur-
suit of truth, for the sake of truth only. Faithfulness to the Master demands reiterating his insights and controlling their results, and this intellectual attitude protects the philosophical school, a milieu of a living thought in pursuit of truth, against sinking into scholastics. Father Styczeń would repeatedly say, after Plato, that one should love every truth, and in everyone, and he would paraphrase Aristotle saying that one should love truth more than one loves one’s friends. The depth of his bonds with others – developed in the encounter of those concerned about truth – is shown in the testimonies of his friends, disciples and collaborators.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

JOHN PAUL II – “So that the cross of Christ might not be emptied of its meaning”

“Pilate’s question: «What is truth» reflects the distressing perplexity of a man who often no longer knows who he is, whence he comes and where he is going. Hence we not infrequently witness the fearful plunging of the human person into situations of gradual self-destruction. According to some, it appears that one no longer need acknowledge the enduring absoluteness of any moral value. All around us we encounter contempt for human life after conception and before birth; the ongoing violation of basic rights of the person; the unjust destruction of goods minimally necessary for a human life. Indeed, something more serious has happened: man is no longer convinced that only in the truth can he find salvation. The saving power of the truth is contested, and freedom alone, uprooted from any objectivity, is left to decide by itself what is good and what is evil. This relativism becomes, in the field of theology, a lack of trust in the wisdom of God, who guides man with the moral law. Concrete situations are unfavourably contrasted with the precepts of the moral law, nor is it any longer maintained that, when all is said and done, the law of God is always the one true good of man.”4

In a particular way, it is in the Crucified Christ that the Church finds the answer to the question troubling so many people today: how can obedience to universal and unchanging moral norms respect the uniqueness and individuality of the person, and not represent a threat to his freedom and dignity? The Church makes her own the Apostle Paul’s awareness of the mission he had received: “Christ [...] sent me [...] to preach the Gospel, and not with eloquent wisdom, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its power [...]. We preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1:17, 23-24). The Crucified Christ reveals the authentic meaning of freedom; he lives it fully in the total gift of himself and calls his disciples to share in his freedom. [...] Rational reflection and daily experience demonstrate the weakness which marks man’s freedom. That freedom is real but limited: its absolute and uncon-

ditional origin is not in itself, but in the life within which it is situated and which represents for it, at one and the same time, both a limitation and a possibility. Human freedom belongs to us as creatures; it is a freedom which is given as a gift, one to be received like a seed and to be cultivated responsibly. It is an essential part of that creaturely image which is the basis of the dignity of the person. Within that freedom there is an echo of the primordial vocation whereby the Creator calls man to the true Good, and even more, through Christ’s Revelation, to become his friend and to share his own divine life. It is at once inalienable self-possession and openness to all that exists, in passing beyond self to knowledge and love of the other. Freedom then is rooted in the truth about man, and it is ultimately directed towards communion.

Reason and experience not only confirm the weakness of human freedom; they also confirm its tragic aspects. Man comes to realize that his freedom is in some mysterious way inclined to betray this openness to the True and the Good, and that all too often he actually prefers to choose finite, limited and ephemeral goods. What is more, within his errors and negative decisions, man glimpses the source of a deep rebellion, which leads him to reject the Truth and the Good in order to set himself up as an absolute principle unto himself: “You will be like God” (Gen 3:5.) Consequently, freedom itself needs to be set free. It is Christ who sets it free: he “has set us free for freedom” (cf. Gal 5:1).

[...] Christ reveals, first and foremost, that the frank and open acceptance of truth is the condition for authentic freedom: “You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free” (Jn 8:32). This is truth which sets one free in the face of worldly power and which gives the strength to endure martyrdom. So it was with Jesus before Pilate: “For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth” (Jn 18:37). The true worshippers of God must thus worship him “in spirit and truth” (Jn 4:23): in this worship they become free. Worship of God and a relationship with truth are revealed in Jesus Christ as the deepest foundation of freedom.

Furthermore, Jesus reveals by his whole life, and not only by his words, that freedom is acquired in love, that is, in the gift of self. The one who says: “Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (Jn 15:13), freely goes out to meet his Passion (cf. Mt 26:46), and in obedience to the Father gives his life on the Cross for all men (cf. Phil 2:6-11). Contemplation of Jesus Crucified is thus the highroad which the Church must tread every day if she wishes to understand the full meaning of freedom: the gift of self in service to God and one’s brethren. Communion with the Crucified and Risen Lord is the never-ending source from which the Church draws unceasingly in order to live in freedom, to give of herself and to serve. Commenting on the verse in Psalm 100 “Serve the Lord with gladness”, Saint Augustine says: “In the house of the Lord, slavery is free. It is free because it serves not out of necessity, but out of charity... Charity should make you a servant, just as truth has made you

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free [...] you are at once both a servant and free: a servant, because you have become such; free, because you are loved by God your Creator; indeed, you have also been enabled to love your Creator [...] You are a servant of the Lord and you are a freedman of the Lord. Do not go looking for a liberation which will lead you far from the house of your liberator!

[...]

It is urgent to rediscover and to set forth once more the authentic reality of the Christian faith, which is not simply a set of propositions to be accepted with intellectual assent. Rather, faith is a lived knowledge of Christ, a living remembrance of his commandments, and a truth to be lived out. A word, in any event, is not truly received until it passes into action, until it is put into practice. Faith is a decision involving one’s whole existence. It is an encounter, a dialogue, a communion of love and of life between the believer and Jesus Christ, the Way, and the Truth, and the Life (cf. Jn 14:6). It entails an act of trusting abandonment to Christ, which enables us to live as he lived (cf. Gal 2:20), in profound love of God and of our brothers and sisters.

[...] Faith also possesses a moral content. It gives rise to and calls for a consistent life commitment; it entails and brings to perfection the acceptance and observance of God’s commandments. As Saint John writes, “God is light and in him is no darkness at all. If we say we have fellowship with him while we walk in darkness, we lie and do not live according to the truth [...]. And by this we may be sure that we know him, if we keep his commandments. He who says «I know him» but disobeys his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him; but whoever keeps his word, in him truly love for God is perfected. By this we may be sure that we are in him: he who says he abides in him ought to walk in the same way in which he walked” (1 Jn 1:5-6; 2:3-6).

Through the moral life, faith becomes «confession», not only before God but also before men: it becomes witness. “You are the light of the world,” said Jesus; “a city set on a hill cannot be hid. Nor do men light a lamp and put it under a bushel, but on a stand, and it gives light to all in the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven” (Mt 5:14-16). These works are above all those of charity (cf. Mt 25:31-46) and of the authentic freedom which is manifested and lived in the gift of self, even to the total gift of self, like that of Jesus, who on the Cross “loved the Church and gave himself up for her” (Eph 5:25). Christ’s witness is the source, model and means for the witness of his disciples, who are called to walk on the same road: “If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me” (Lk 9:23). Charity, in conformity with the radical demands of the Gospel, can lead the believer to the supreme witness of martyrdom. Once again this means imitating Jesus who died on the Cross: “Be imitators of God, as beloved children,” Paul writes to the Christians of Ephesus, “and walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God” (Eph 5:1-2).

[...] The relationship between faith and morality shines forth with all its brilliance in the unconditional respect due to the insistent demands of the personal...
dignity of every man, demands protected by those moral norms which prohibit without exception actions which are intrinsically evil. The universality and the immutability of the moral norm make manifest and at the same time serve to protect the personal dignity and inviolability of man, on whose face is reflected the splendour of God (cf. Gen 9:5-6).

[...]
Martyrdom, accepted as an affirmation of the inviolability of the moral order, bears splendid witness both to the holiness of God’s law and to the inviolability of the personal dignity of man, created in God’s image and likeness. This dignity may never be disparaged or called into question, even with good intentions, whatever the difficulties involved. Jesus warns us most sternly: “What does it profit a man, to gain the whole world and forfeit his life?” (Mk 8:36).
Martyrdom rejects as false and illusory whatever «human meaning» one might claim to attribute, even in «exceptional» conditions, to an act morally evil in itself. Indeed, it even more clearly unmasks the true face of such an act: it is a violation of man’s «humanity,» in the one perpetrating it even before the one enduring it. Hence martyrdom is also the exaltation of a person’s perfect «humanity» and of true «life,» as is attested by Saint Ignatius of Antioch, addressing the Christians of Rome, the place of his own martyrdom: “Have mercy on me, brethren: do not hold me back from living; do not wish that I die... Let me arrive at the pure light; once there I will be truly a man. Let me imitate the passion of my God.”

Although martyrdom represents the high point of the witness to moral truth, and one to which relatively few people are called, there is nonetheless a consistent witness which all Christians must daily be ready to make, even at the cost of suffering and grave sacrifice. Indeed, faced with the many difficulties which fidelity to the moral order can demand, even in the most ordinary circumstances, the Christian is called, with the grace of God invoked in prayer, to a sometimes heroic commitment. In this he or she is sustained by the virtue of fortitude, whereby — as Gregory the Great teaches — one can actually “love the difficulties of this world for the sake of eternal rewards.”

In this witness to the absoluteness of the moral good Christians are not alone: they are supported by the moral sense present in peoples and by the great religious and sapiential traditions of East and West, from which the interior and mysterious workings of God’s Spirit are not absent. The words of the Latin poet Juvenal apply to all: “Consider it the greatest of crimes to prefer survival to honour and, out of love of physical life, to lose the very reason for living.” The voice of conscience has always clearly recalled that there are truths and moral values for which one must be prepared to give up one’s life. In an individual’s
words and above all in the sacrifice of his life for a moral value, the Church sees a single testimony to that truth which, already present in creation, shines forth in its fullness on the face of Christ. As Saint Justin put it, “the Stoics, at least in their teachings on ethics, demonstrated wisdom, thanks to the seed of the Word present in all peoples, and we know that those who followed their doctrines met with hatred and were killed.”

Mary is the radiant sign and inviting model of the moral life. As Saint Ambrose put it, “The life of this one person can serve as a model for everyone,” and while speaking specifically to virgins but within a context open to all, he affirmed: “The first stimulus to learning is the nobility of the teacher. Who can be more noble than the Mother of God? Who can be more glorious than the one chosen by Glory Itself?” Mary lived and exercised her freedom precisely by giving herself to God and accepting God’s gift within herself. Until the time of his birth, she sheltered in her womb the Son of God who became man; she raised him and enabled him to grow, and she accompanied him in that supreme act of freedom which is the complete sacrifice of his own life. By the gift of herself, Mary entered fully into the plan of God who gives himself to the world. By accepting and pondering in her heart events which she did not always understand (cf. Lk 2:19), she became the model of all those who hear the word of God and keep it (cf. Lk 11:28), and merited the title of “Seat of Wisdom.” This Wisdom is Jesus Christ himself, the Eternal Word of God, who perfectly reveals and accomplishes the will of the Father (cf. Heb 10:5-10). Mary invites everyone to accept this Wisdom. To us too she addresses the command she gave to the servants at Cana in Galilee during the marriage feast: “Do whatever he tells you” (Jn 2:5).

Mary shares our human condition, but in complete openness to the grace of God. Not having known sin, she is able to have compassion on every kind of weakness. She understands sinful man and loves him with a Mother’s love. Precisely for this reason she is on the side of truth and shares the Church’s burden in recalling always and to everyone the demands of morality. Nor does she permit sinful man to be deceived by those who claim to love him by justifying his sin, for she knows that the sacrifice of Christ her Son would thus be emptied of its power. No absolution offered by beguiling doctrines, even in the areas of philosophy and theology, can make man truly happy: only the Cross and the glory of the Risen Christ can grant peace to his conscience and salvation to his life.

Keywords: truth, faith, relationship between faith and morality, witness martyrdom

The published text includes extracts from His Holiness John Paul II’s Encyclical Letter Veritatis splendor of 6 August 1993.


14 Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. II. 7, col. 220.
Tadeusz Styczeń’s personalist ethics, which refers to moral experience, remains open to the evidence provided by the Revelation. Moral experience may be interpreted both in the «language of values» and in the «language of duty.» While obeying the principle of accurate description of moral experience, Styczeń stresses the relation between the moral duty and the dignity of the person, and interprets this relation as an objective reason for the duty to affirm the person as a value in itself. The autonomy of moral experience determines the autonomy of what is «due» in the moral sense, and thus ethics turns out to be a discipline which remains independent of metaphysics or religion. Moral duty, which is experientially acknowledged, demands a further metaphysical analysis. While Hume pointed that there exists an unbridgeable gulf between «is statements» to «ought statement,» Styczeń points to the actual experiential grasp of moral duty and even formulates the thesis that there is a necessary passage from «ought statements» to «is statements.» In his pursuit of the ontologically ultimate moral duty which simultaneously conforms to the evidence of human experience, the ethicist cannot fail to discover the Absolute as Person. The metaphysics pursued in the light of moral experience becomes then a metaphysics of gift.

Within the evidence of human experience lies the fact of moral collapse of man. While attempting to explain the phenomenon which Ovid described by means of his famous adage: Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor, ethics becomes a «philosophy of the Advent,» open to the saving interference of God in human history. The Christian vision of the misery and the glory of man confirms the evidence provided by moral experience; moreover, it sheds new light on it. An adequate solution of the problem of man demands an adequate answer to the question of who man is, while this answer is to be sought by way of synthesis of reason and faith.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: moral experience, value, duty, dignity of the person, independent ethics, metaphysics of the gift, moral collapse, ethics as the «philosophy of Advent.»

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A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF FR. TADEUSZ STYCZEŃ (C.R.)

Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS [Societas Divini Salvatoris], was born on December 21, 1931 in Wołowice, a village near Cracow, Poland. He studied theology on the Theological Faculty at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and in the Dominican Institute for Philosophy and Theology in Cracow. In 1955, he was ordained to the priesthood. He completed his philosophical studies at the Catholic University of Lublin, and specialized in moral philosophy in the Department of Ethics, chaired by Rev. Karol Wojtyła, Ph.D., Honorary Professor of the Catholic University of Lublin. In 1960, Father Styczeń received a Master’s degree in ethics (having presented a Master’s thesis on *N. Hartmann’s Concept of Virtue*). In 1963, he received a doctoral degree from the Catholic University of Lublin (having presented a dissertation on *The Problem of the Possibility of Ethics in John Locke’s Philosophy*). In 1963, he was employed in the Department of Ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin, where he continued his research. In 1971, he presented a post-doctoral dissertation (*Habilitation*) entitled *The Problem of a Possibility of Ethics as an Empirically Justified and Universally Valid Theory of Morality*. In 1981, he became Assistant Professor at the Catholic University of Lublin and in 1992, he received the title and post of Full Professor. From 1978 to 2002, he held the Chair of Ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin and was Director of the Department of Ethics. From 1982 to 2006 he was Director of the John Paul II Institute at the Catholic University of Lublin and Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly *Ethos*, both of which he was also the Founder. In 1975, he was Visiting Professor in J. Gutenberg University in Mainz. From 1981 to 1986, he was also Professor in Pontifical John Paul II Institute For Studies on Marriage and Family in Rome. He was Co-founder (in 1981) and Member of the Senate of the International Academy of Philosophy in Dallas, USA (its present location is in the Principality of Liechtenstein and Chile). He was Member of Societas Ethica, Member of the Learned Society of the Catholic University of Lublin, Member of Polish Philosophical Society, Member of Polish Theological Society. From 1981, he served as Consultant to the Pontifical Council for the Family and from 1985, as Consultant to the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Health Care Workers. From 1994, he was member of the Pontifical Academy for Life. He was Member of the Research Council of the Institute for the Studies of Family in the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warszawa-Łomianki, founded by the late Abp. Kazimierz Majdański. He was Member of the Editorial Board of *Roczniki Filozoficzne* [“Philosophical Yearly”] He was joint editor of the periodical *Aletheia*, published by the IAP in Liechtenstein, as well as joint editor of the quarterly *Anthropotes*, published at the Lateran University in Rome. He cooperated with the journals *Il Nuovo Areopago* and *La Nuova Europa*. He was Expert of the Senate Committee for Constitutional Matters. In 1994, he received an honoray doctorate from the University of Navarra in Pamplona, and in 2007, an honoray doctorate from the Lateran University in Rome.
In 2006, he was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta and Austrian Cross of Honour for Science and Art, First Class.
In 2007, he received Medal for the Merits for the Catholic University of Lublin.
In 2006, Father Styczeń retired from full professorship, but he remained Honorary Director of the John Paul II Institute.
He authored over 400 publications, including 20 books. He was also editor of numerous monographic collections, primarily on the thought of John Paul II.
Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń died on October 14, 2010, in St. Hedwig Hospital in Trzebnica near Wrocław, after a long illness.

Card. Stanisław DZIWISZ – “Whether we live or die, we are the Lord’s”


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Fr. Stanisław JANECZEK – A Passion for Truth and Act

Address delivered during the Memorial Service, Trzebinia, 21 Oct. 2010

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http://www.kul.pl/2617.html

Tadeusz STYCZEŃ, SDS – Religious Authority and Personal Faith, Facing the Autonomy of Conscience

The author refers to the Biblical narrative of the drama of Abraham, whom God commands to sacrifice his son Isaac. Abraham’s dilemma was already philosophically explored by Kierkegaard in his Fear and Trembling. In the present considerations the author gives an analysis of the relation between authority (in particular religious authority) and the autonomy of conscience. Why does Abraham consent to obey God’s cruel command if God’s reasons are hidden from him? The only justifiable answer is that God’s reasons God had earlier revealed to Abraham were sufficiently strong so that now he does not need to ask any further questions. While the reasons of this particular command are still hidden from him, the authority of God has a sufficiently strong foundation in his eyes so that he can accept, by virtue of the authority of God, the command he cannot comprehend. Therefore, in this particular situation, all Abraham wants is to protect his son, Isaac, from losing faith in God’s love.
The author poses the question of what determines the moral nature of duty. On the one hand, he points that a reference to the law-giving authority, external to the acting subject, is present not only in religious ethical systems (it can be found, for instance, in M. Schlick’s proposal of ethics). On the other hand, he observes that one can hardly conceive of a moral duty that does not involve the acting subject’s inner conviction about the rightness of his action. Thus, he says, one may conclude that the moral duty to perform a given action is determined by the combination of an external, transsubjective element (the command of the authority) and an internal, intrasubjective one (the subject’s recognition of the command and the decision to consider it as binding on the basis of this recognition). However, the command of the authority and the subject’s personal conviction are frequently in conflict. Thus the author continues to explore whether in such situations the subject should give priority to the authority or to his or her personal conviction. He also investigates the possibility that the realm of morality is inherently torn apart and incoherent already at its roots.

Yet the author stresses that if Abraham’s inner struggle is perceived merely in terms of the conflict between his conscience and the authority of the command-giver, we will fail to grasp the essence of the dilemma he experiences. The «reasons of the heart,» to which Abraham gives priority over the «reasons of the reason» and in the name of which he has «suspended» the latter, do not stop being his own reasons. He does not perceive them directly, but he is convinced about their existence and about them being morally significant to him, because he believes that they must be morally significant to the One who has so far sufficiently proven himself to him as «expert» in issues of morality and whom he (Abraham) has for this reason absolutely trusted and absolutely believed. Therefore Abraham now considers as morally binding the reasons unknown to him, provided they are sufficient for God to make this strange command.

According to a «secular» interpretation, the drama of Abraham can be perceived as a dilemma between the view in favor of total autonomy of conscience in issues of morality and the one that the source of moral duty lies in an authority which is external to the acting subject. Yet we must not fail to see that also the first position involves a reference to authority, even if it is the authority of conscience itself (as, for instance, in Kantian ethics). In his discussion of Kant’s position the author points that a moral judgment, which is simultaneously a cognitive act, appears as a result of the coincidence of an act of the subject and the duty generating object, which is external to the acting subject.

A moral controversy presupposes that its sides are rational subjects capable of formulating arguments which support their respective positions and that they are open to the criterion of truth which is external to both of them. Without such a criterion of truth a moral controversy might turn into an irresolvable tragedy.

Summarized by Cezary Ritter
Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: Fear and Trembling, authority, command in ethics, autonomy of the acting subject, freedom of conscience, nature of duty
Tadeusz STYCZEŃ, SDS – Self−Portrait of Man: Adequate Anthropology, as advanced by Karol Wojtyła–John Paul II’s

From the beginning of philosophy various thinkers have attempted to answer the question of what man is. The author analyzes the answer proposed by Protagoras, who claimed that man is the measure of all things, and observes that it might have been satisfactory for the subsequent generations were it not for Socrates. The latter did not so much oppose Protagoras’s claim as attempted to point to the sine qua non condition determining its reasonableness, and he established that condition by pointing to the objective criterion of truth. According to Protagoras’s interpretation, man is the measure of all things when he relies on himself only, while Socrates holds that man is the measure of all things if he relies on the truth about them, itself independent of him. In this light, the Socratic project, expressed by means of the rule: “Know thyself,” aims at self-knowledge obtained in the light of truth, and as such it ultimately aims at shaping righteous conscience.

According to Styczeń, the controversy between Protagoras and Socrates is not merely a controversy between two philosophical positions, but also one about the soul of culture, and it continues throughout the entire human history. In fact, it is a controversy about the identity of man. Styczeń believes that Karol Wojtyła–John Paul II is a thoroughly Socratic thinker. He presents Wojtyła as a philosopher who accepts the Socratic view of man and who simultaneously develops this view, pointing to its rootedness in actual moral experience. Within the scope of moral experience lies the experience of guilt which may be explained only by the existence of an objective (veritative) criterion which either commands or prohibits something (moral duty). Thus the experience of guilt simultaneously opens a theological perspective for the philosophical reflection on man.

Styczeń concludes by saying that at this point Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical discourse about the human being is complemented by the theology he advanced as Pope John Paul II. The reason is that a human being, who by him- or herself is capable of choosing what offends truth and doing what he or she must not do, is unable to annul the consequences of such a choice and of such actions. The Christian revelation brings the «good news» about the Redeemer of man (Redemptor hominis), who has the power to free man from the guilt that rests on him. The Redeemer is the Son of God, who in order to redeem man became man himself.

Summarized by Cezary Ritter
Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: Protagoras, Socrates, Karol Wojtyła, conception of man, experience of guilt, relation between philosophy and religion
Tadeusz STYCZEŃ, SDS – Freedom in Truth

The drama of Socrates, who rejected the opportunity to escape from prison, thus choosing imprisonment and death in order to witness to the truth he held, was a shock to his student Plato. In the present article, Tadeusz Styczeń puts forward the idea that Plato’s Academy was in fact «born» in Socrates’s prison cell. The drama Socrates experienced is shared by numerous prisoners of conscience, up to the present day. The current article was written in the Poland of the 1980’s, when many Poles (the proverbial Kowalskis) were put in prison due to their opposition to the oppressive government. The Kowalski of that time would be offered freedom if he agreed to sign a declaration of loyalty to the regime. Yet he would realize that he must not accept the freedom he was thus being offered, as the price for it was abandonment of the truth he had himself recognized and for the sake of which he was imprisoned. Moreover, he would realize that if he left prison for that price, he would actually lose his freedom. The only way to save it was to remain faithful to the truth he cherished. He would realize that no other freedom deserved its name.

To Styczeń, the Kowalski of the Poland of the 1980’s is a Polish Socrates (no wonder Styczeń puts him in one line with prisoners of conscience such as Thomas More or Card. Stefan Wyszyński), who owing to his steadfastness succeeded in saving the «humanity» in himself, and who, by his rejection to leave prison for the price of his abandonment of truth was striving to save the humanity in those who had imprisoned him. Thus he was a «proof by demonstration,» confirming the existence of the significant, inseparable bond between freedom and truth. Just as centuries ago Socrates’s firm stance inspired Plato’s Academy, today’s Kowalski may well become an inspiration for the modern academia, whose task is service to truth and thus service to human freedom and human subjectivity.

Summarized by Cezary Ritter
Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: freedom, truth, conscience, political prisoners, prisoners of conscience

Jarosław MERECKI, SDS – Tadeusz Styczeń’s Revealing the Person

The paper seeks to reconstruct the philosophy of the person implied by the ethical writings of Tadeusz Styczeń. In particular the author poses two questions: What is – according to Styczeń – the proper method of philosophical anthropology? and: Which experiences reveal the very essence of the personal being?

As far as the method of philosophical anthropology is concerned Styczeń adopted the phenomenological method in its form developed by Karol Wojtyła in his anthropological treatise The Acting Person. According to Styczeń, anthropology should start from the immediate experience of the person and the direct insight into the personal being is accessible first of all in the self-experience of the philosopher. Nevertheless philosophy cannot be practiced as a sort of «egology,» hence the necessity to test the reliability of one’s own experience through the
confrontation with the experience of other persons. The next step consists in the interpretation of the material gathered in the phenomenological description, that is from the phenomenology the philosopher passes to the metaphysics of the human person. At the same time, even as a metaphysician the philosopher should always control his theory returning to experience. According to Styczeń, the act of stating the truth is the experience that reveals the essence of the person in the most evident way. In the act of passing the judgment on something the person transcends the boundaries of his/her own being and states the truth that does not depend on him/her. At the same time the act of stating the truth implies that the person interiorizes the truth in question and becomes its witness. In this, for Styczeń, anthropology and ethics start from the same original experience and develop its distinct aspects.

Keywords: Tadeusz Styczeń, personalism, philosophical anthropology, phenomenology of the person, relation between anthropology and ethics

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Witold STARNAWSKI – The Mystery of the Person

The most important issues which determine the significance of the ethical output of Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS, are related to his discovering and exposing the truth about the human person. This truth has its metaphysical and experiential aspects. The specificity of the person enables, and indeed prompts, a special insight into his ontological structure: one made «from within,» by way self-knowledge. While one must not fail to remember that this method of investigation bears the danger of subjectivism, one must step on this way, since there is no better way to know the person. This method is a dictate of philosophical realism. The person is revealed in a particular way in ethics, and that is why an ethicist bears a particular duty, namely, he must be a witness to values to others. The person cannot be fully known, being a mystery which one can approach best if one adopts «the logic of love.» Styczeń holds that an ethicist pursuing the truth about the human person, must not evade pointing to the One who showed it best what it means to be Person, since this Person is the Absolute of Love.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: ethics, person, self-knowledge, witness, mystery, love

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Piotr ŚLĘCZKA, SDS – Defender of the Unborn

In the ethics worked out by the late Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS, a special position is given to the right to life belonging to every unborn baby. In his philosophical analyses Styczeń demonstrates the way to discover the personal dignity of a baby before his or her birth. The beginning of a human being, which results from the conception of the new life in question, for reasons of logic and rationality must be tantamount to the origin of the personal dignity of this human individual. No other approach to this issue is rationally acceptable since it is impossible to point, in the process of the development of an already existing life, to a single moment when the existence of a «non-human» being transforms into the existence of a human being. Since every unborn baby is a person who cannot defend his or her right to life, he or she needs special protection in state law. However, in many states, including democratic ones, the situation is reverse: the law does not protect the lives of the unborn. Styczeń describes this situation as a veiled totalitarianism in which the principle of equality of all before the law is violated.

In the theological aspect, Styczeń associated the dignity of human life with the fact that life is always a gift from the Creator, its ultimate source, who in way shares his own being with every human.

In the article, three fields have been distinguished in which Styczeń was striving for protection of and respect for the lives of the unborn, namely, his academic career, his social involvement and his concern about the proper interpretation of the teaching of the Catholic Church about the dignity of life.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: Styczeń Tadeusz, pro-life, abortion, post-abortion syndrome, imperfect laws

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Rocco BUTTIGLIONE – Ethics as Fidelity to Experience (trans. P. Mikulska)

The author explores Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń’s concept of ethics as an autonomous discipline based on moral experience as its specific starting point. Following Styczeń, he focuses on the demonstration of the possibility of creating ethics that would be, on the one hand, centred on the human person as a subject, and on the other hand – objective. Placing Styczeń’s ideas, inspired by Karol Wojtyla, in the context of the history of philosophy, he presents the so conceived of objective ethics of the person as a solution to the fundamental dilemmas of modern and contemporary thought.

Summarized by Patrycja Mikulska
Keywords: Tadeusz Styczeń, Karol Wojtyła, concept of ethics, autonomous ethics, objective ethics, moral experience, subjectivity

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Kazimierz KRAJEWSKI – Truth as the Basis of Ethics in the Thought of Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

The article comprises an outline of the ethics Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS, developed in the final period of his philosophical activity. In the ethics in question, which is a version of ethical personalism, the key role belongs to the category of truth. Styczeń discovers an inseparable bond between respect for the truth stated by the subject and the subject’s self-respect. The source of this – so-called veritatively – conception of ethics can be traced back, on the one hand, to the historic dilemma experienced by the political prisoners in the Poland of the 1980’s, who were promised freedom by the communist regime on condition that they renounced their views and refrained from any political activity. On the other hand, however, while working on this conception of truth, Styczeń was inspired by the discovery of the normative power of truth, made by Karol Wojtyła in his work *The Acting Person*, and by his idea that it is the normative power of truth that ultimately shapes human freedom.

Thus basis of Tadeusz Styczeń’s ethics is the experience of the normative power of truth, inherent in every cognitive act in which the subject states or denies something. The moment of assertion, always present in such acts, does not merely serve to express a certain state of affairs, as it necessarily comprises the affirmation on the part of the cognitive subject of the object being cognized. The subject engages his or her freedom, taking the side of the truth in question, to such an extent that if he or she should deny it, they would deny themselves. In this way a human being discovers that he or she must not deny the truth he or she has stated. This discovery is tantamount to the subject realizing the normative dimension of a cognitive act or, in other words, of its inherently moral dimension. Thus moral valuation (normativeness) comes to light already at the level of a cognitive act. The essence of moral experience is then the process in which the evidence the subject internalizes («self-information») becomes a «self-imperative» or a command, addressed to him or her, to respect the recognized truth. Styczeń expresses this experience by means of his formula: I must not deny («self-imperative») what I have stated myself («self-information»). The fundamental norm of his ethics is: Truth demands affirmation for the sake of truth. Truth is the first good a human being encounters and – which Styczeń stresses – it is «through» truth that a human being knows all the objective goods.

The experience of truth as such enables a discovery of the truth about who man is. In an act of knowing truth, the human being discovers him- or herself as a witness and depositary to truth, responsible for the truth he or she has stated and in this sense also responsible for him- or herself. Thus a moral subject turns out re-
sponsible for the witness and depositary to truth present in him- or herself. This
discovery made by the subject is simultaneously a discovery of his or her digni-
ity. A human being respects his or her dignity and thus preserves his or her per-
sonal subjectivity on condition that he or she is a witness to the truth he or she
has recognized.
Self-experience makes it possible – holds Styczeń – to discover, by way of in-
tellectual intuition, the structure of self as self. Through this universal truth
about my own self, I grasp the truth about every other self. I can «access» another
self only through my own self. If the truth about my own self is the same as the
truth about every other self, then I must not do to any other self anything I am
not allowed to do to mine. The affirmation of my own self, or self-affirmation –
according to Styczeń – becomes a model for the affirmation of every other self.
Thus the fundamental principle of ethical personalism: *Persona est affirmanda
propter seipsam*, draws its content and justification from a direct insight into
the structure of my own self, which is revealed to me in my cognitive act.
The foundation of Styczeń’s ethics is the indissoluble bond between the infor-
mative and the normative aspects of a cognitive act. The truth the subject has
stated is binding and demands being recognized. This in turn determines the
fact that the starting point of ethics is simultaneously the starting point of an-
thropology. The reverse is certainly true too. Styczeń would express it by means
of the Latin phrase: *Primum anthropologicum et primum ethicum convertuntur.*
Therefore «the primary» in the order of duty (ethics) is inseparably bound with
«the primary» in the order of being (anthropology). The ethics he so conceived
of Styczeń would call normative anthropology. Its basis is, once again, the ex-
perience of truth and its normative power.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

Keywords: truth, «self-information,» normative power of truth, «self-impera-
tive,» depositary to truth, self, *persona est affirmanda propter seipsam*, truth-
doing, self-transcendence, anthropopraxis, normative anthropology

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Andrzej SZOSTEK, MIC – On the Respect for the Moral Power of Truth: The Unfinished
Conversations with Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

A landmark in the output of Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS, was his lecture “Freedom
in Truth,” published in 1988. It was there that Styczeń for the first time stated
that the recognition of a truth, even of a most banal truth, is so binding for hu-
man freedom that a betrayal of any truth stated by the subject and recognized by
him or her as true is a violence done to this personal subject, who is rational and
free, and this is so regardless of any other harm such a betrayal of truth might trigger. This precious idea, inspired by the events from the Solidarity period in Poland deserves a gracious and critical continuation, which was difficult for Styczń himself due to his deteriorating health.

The author of the article points to the fact that stating a truth is inescapably connected to its valuation and to the recognition that at the given moment precisely this truth, out of an infinite number of possible truths, deserves being known and recognized as true. However, the attempt, undertaken by Styczń, to derive personalism from his analysis of a cognitive act of truth knowing will fail unless it incorporates the experience of knowing the value of the person and his or her dignity, «given» to the subject to recognize. Thus the aim of an ethicist must be to combine the «inner» experience of the subject’s freedom being bound by the truth he or she has recognized with the «external» one, which consists in knowing the value of the recognized being, in particular of a personal being.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: truth, freedom, dignity, moral experience, ethics

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Agnieszka LEKKA-KOWALIK – Science and the Ethics of Science: The Fruits of the Binding Power of Truth

The paper first discusses the question of whether there exists any ethics for scientists, as well as the answer to this question proposed by Tadeusz Styczń. This constitutes the point of departure for arguing that the ethics of science is grounded in the binding power of truth (which is another concept worked out by Styczń). In order to demonstrate it it is argued that (1) truth as adaequatio is the goal of science neither replaceable nor reducible to any set of cognitive values; (2) the binding power of truth is the basis for the methodological requirement that reliable scientific results should be accepted by all researchers; (3) methodological value-judgements have a basis in ethical value-judgments, and there are no reasons why the former should be recognized as binding researchers and the latter as not binding them; (4) there is no conflict between cognitive values and ethical ones, for respecting any of them requires respecting truths cognized by the researchers, regardless of the domain those truths belong to, i.e. ethical truths are binding in the same way as biological ones. The practical consequences of this approach are shortly sketched, among them the need to reform education and the training of young scientists.
Ryszard WIŚNIEWSKI – Is Ethics as a Science Possible? On the Early Ethical Work of Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

The article is focused on the early, so far unpublished ethical output of Tadeusz Styczeń, which includes his Master’s thesis on Nicolai Hartmann’s virtue ethics and his doctoral dissertation, in which he critically explored John Locke’s concept of moral science.

In the first of these works, Styczeń, drawing on the original texts, arrives at the conclusion that Hartmann’s declared intention of a synthesis of modern phenomenological ethics and classical ethics was unsuccessful, at least in the field of virtue ethics, due to the fact that he deprived ethics and its Aristotelian tradition of the qualities of: realism, teleological unity of being and value, and rationality of moral knowledge.

While highly evaluating the cognitive value of this work, as well as appreciating its pioneering character on the Polish ground, the author of the article points that in the light of the newest research of the foundations of virtue ethics in Aristotle, some reservations Styczeń makes might turn out arguable.

In the second work analyzed in the article, Styczeń attempts an application of Locke’s theory of science (epistemology and methodology) to the empirical, real world of morality. This procedure demonstrates Locke’s significant failure which results from his obscure use of the concepts of reality and experience on the grounds of ethics. However, the course of the critical analyses advanced by Styczeń simultaneously reveals the complex nature of the problem of the synthesis of the imperative aspect of ethics and its realistic attitude to moral experience. The author of the article is convinced that the path Styczeń started to follow in his doctoral dissertation turned out crucial in shaping his further metaethical and ethical research, which culminated in his post-doctoral dissertation, and which touches the key problems of modern ethics.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: Nicolai Hartmann’s theory of virtue, John Locke’s conception of moral science, Tadeusz Styczeń’s theory of ethics, Aristotelian ethics, Max Scheler’s ethics, ethics as a science, experience in ethics, realism in ethics
Jacek FRYDRYCH – Intellectualism in the Ethics of Tadeusz Styczeń

The ethics developed by Tadeusz Styczeń is a variant of ethical personalism. He holds that the source of moral duty is truth and the dignity of the human person. In the current article, I present Styczeń’s fundamental theses which point to his ethical intellectualism. I also present an analysis of ethical intellectualism and demonstrate that Styczeń’s ethics can be perceived as its moderate version, while it is not intellectualist in the extreme sense of the term. To conclude, I demonstrate that the presented understanding of ethics is essentially internalist.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: Tadeusz Styczeń, ethical personalism, ethical intellectualism, moral knowledge, truth, internalism, externalism

Anna GŁĄB – Literary Fiction in Ethics

The article undertakes the consideration of the relation between literary fiction and ethics in the philosophical output of Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS. The problem in question is approached from a broader perspective encompassing the relations between literature and philosophy in general. Against this background, the author discusses the inspiration Styczeń drew from literature for the development of his ethics and for his approach to communicating it.

Apart from presenting particular instances of Styczeń’s reference to literary fiction in his ethics, the author considers two aspects of the relation between literature and ethics in his work, namely, the relevance of this relation for him in constructing and teaching moral philosophy and his reference to instances of literary fiction that would ensure that the conclusions thus formulated, while not being necessary truths, would retain the status of rational statements in ethical discourse. As far as the first aspect is concerned, the author’s attention is focused on the first-person narration, so significant in communicating ethics. The author also considers the possibility of complementing the shortcomings of
an ethical theory by literary fiction. As far as the second aspect of the present considerations is concerned, the author refers to particular instances in which Styczniół combined poetry with ethical discourse and stresses the significance of enthymematic statements for moral philosophy.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: ethics, literary fiction, person, experience, dialogue, moral influence

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Małgorzata BORKOWSKA−NOWAK – Dramatis personae: The Groundwork of Morality in the Philosophies of Tadeusz Styczniół, SDS, and Fr. Józef Tischner

The current article describes the way of approaching the human person as an actor in a drama, common to both Styczniół and Tischner. According to both philosophers, the human being, the subject of morality, is a dramatis persona: a «mask» and protagonist of the drama taking place on the stage of the world. The human life is, in turn, the role which is to be played in as perfect a way as possible, with the consideration of the significance as well as the uniqueness of the performance in question.

The drama of a human person involves various levels and the article discusses the two most important ones, namely the sphere of cognition, in particular of self-knowledge, and that of freedom.

According to Styczniół, the most important moment in the moral life of a human person is that of accomplishing self-knowledge, followed with the discovery of oneself as the subject of one’s actions.

In Tischner’s philosophy, in turn, the drama results from the experience of suffering, of pain visible on the face of another human being. As far as the sphere of freedom is concerned, the course of the drama is determined by what happened during its first scene, on the cognitive level.

Keywords: Tadeusz Styczniół, Józef Tischner, philosophy of the drama, moral power of truth, freedom, suffering

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To the Rev. Tadeusz Styczeń, who died in October 2010, Christology was the “heart of the matter” not only in the existential but also in the scientific sense, including the methodological. This is the ethics-oriented Christology or Christologically-motivated ethics (with Christ-Truth as the source of freedom) practised at the Catholic University of Lublin as the heritage of Wojtyła’s–John Paul II’s teaching; this is erudite knowledge (drawing on many fields), wisdom transmitted in diverse forms, but frequently meditation based on Biblical exegesis. This is a profoundly incarnational Christology: Styczeń refers to the mystery of the Incarnation, reconciling anthropocentrism with theocentrism and, consequently, to the mystery of the Cross as an expression of solidarity with God and with man.

Translated by Piotr Czyżewski

Keywords: Tadeusz Styczeń’s ethics, Christology, incarnational Christology, anthropocentrism and theocentrism

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Card. Stanisław NAGY, SCJ – The Loved and Admired Tadeusz

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Rocco BUTTIGLIONE – Philosophy as Testimony of Life (trans. P. Mikulska)

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Hubert ORDON, SDS – “May the angels lead Thee...”

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Stefan SAWICKI – Encounter That Would Last

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“The present exchange focuses on the main ideas of Tadeusz Styczeń’s paper Der Person gebührt die Liebe [“Love is What the Person Deserves”] presented at the symposium celebrating the tenth anniversary of the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein in October 1996. Buttiglione and Styczeń discuss a wide range of metaethical, epistemological, and anthropological issues, focusing on the role of the truth recognized by the subject as the basis for his constitution as rational and free; on the role of the truth as a foundation of social relations, as well as as the source of moral duty. The interlocutors contrast their views with those of David Hume and propose a solution to Hume’s problem of the unity and identity of the subject. They draw on the thought of Plato, Aristotle, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Karol Wojtyła—
–John Paul II, and find an unexpected ally in Johann G. Fichte. The dialogue concludes on an ethical note: Styczeń, looking back at the history of Poland, at its failures and triumphs, and especially at the rise of the Solidarity, emphasizes the precariousness of moral victories that cannot be “owned,” but may only be continuously striven for.

Summarized by Patrycja Mikulska

Keywords: truth, constitution of the subject, identity of the subject, David Hume, Johann G. Fichte


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Fr. Tadeusz STYCZEŃ – Letter to Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of Poland (Lublin, 10 Jan. 1982)

In his letter to Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń protests against the practice, widely employed by the Communist government in Poland, of breaking people’s consciences by making them sign declarations of loyalty to the Communist state.

Fr. Tadeusz STYCZEŃ – Letter to His Magnificence Fr. Prof. Andrzej Szostek, Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, regarding his refusal to accept the Order of Polonia Restituta Knight’s Cross from Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland (Lublin, 9 Oct. 2000)

In his letter to Fr. Prof. Andrzej Szostek, Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń refuses to accept the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta from Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, in order to demonstrate his solidarity with the unborn, whose
right to life was questioned in the amendment to the existing law on abortion approved of by Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski.

Lech ZDYBEL – An «Anthology of Bioethics,» or About Our “Return to Europe”


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Krzysztof POLIT – On Care, or On What We Need Most

Review of Beata Dobrowolska’s Wprowadzenie do medycznej etyki troski [“Introduction to Medical Ethics of Care”], Oficyna Wydawnicza Branta, Bydgoszcz 2010.

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Mirosława CHUDA, Fr. Alfred M. WIERZBICKI – Visual Power of the Concrete

Note on Leszek Mądzik’s spectacle Passage (2010)

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Books Recommended by Ethos


Krzysztof DYBCIAK – John Paul II, as seen in Polish Literature.


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Jakub SZCZEPANIAŃSKI – New Ways of Political Philosophy

Cezary RITTER – The Pope in Berlin, in Madrid, and in Other Places

A feuilleton on World Youth Days.

Cezary RITTER – A Bibliography of Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń’s Publications on the Thought of Karol Wojtyła–John Paul II

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