 zobacz powiększenie | DOI 10.12887/27-2014-2-106-07 Robert PIŁAT – Violence as a Philosophical Problem Cena brutto: 7,00 PLN |
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In the present article I advance a thesis about a close relation between violence and fear, as understood by Søren Kierkegaard. I critically refer to Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of violence, questioning her idea about violence resulting directly from the disintegration of a system of power. I comment on Arend’s popular conclusions expressed in her Eichmann in Jerusalem and On Violence, as well as on Margarethe von Trotta’s recent movie Hannah Arendt. I perceive the junction between fear and power in that fear provides the basis for a self-determination of the subject, which necessarily refers to a sense of power. This power, as opposed to force or authority, manifests itself in breaking the resistance perceived in other subjects as such. Violence exhibits a tendency to annihilate another subjectivity. The relation between this sense of violence and crimes against life is contingent, albeit very strong. The way to reduce violence involves a rejection of power-based identity, which, however, has not found support in our civilization and is insufficient in our culture. Translated by Dorota Chabrajska Keywords: violence, power, evil, subject, fear, self-determination, identity, human dignity, Hannah Arendt, Søren Kierkegaard Contact: Pliki do pobrania: » Pilat.pdf | |
