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DOI 10.12887/27-2014-2-106-07



Robert PIŁAT – Violence as a Philosophical Problem


Cena brutto: 7,00 PLN

In the present article I advance a thesis about a close relation between violence and fear, as understood by Søren Kierkegaard. I critically refer to Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of violence, questioning her idea about violence resulting directly from the disintegration of a system of power. I comment on Arend’s popular conclusions expressed in her Eichmann in Jerusalem and On Violence, as well as on Margarethe von Trotta’s recent movie Hannah Arendt. I perceive the junction between fear and power in that fear provides the basis for a self-determination of the subject, which necessarily refers to a sense of power. This power, as opposed to force or authority, manifests itself in breaking the resistance perceived in other subjects as such. Violence exhibits a tendency to annihilate another subjectivity. The relation between this sense of violence and crimes against life is contingent, albeit very strong. The way to reduce violence involves a rejection of power-based identity, which, however, has not found support in our civilization and is insufficient in our culture.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: violence, power, evil, subject, fear, self-determination, identity, human dignity, Hannah Arendt, Søren Kierkegaard

Contact:
Katedra Teorii Poznania, Sekcja Teorii Poznania i Filozofii Języka, Instytut Filozofii,
Wydział Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego,
ul. Wóycickiego 1/3, 01-938 Warsaw, Poland
E-mail: r.pilat@uksw.edu.pl
Phone: +48 22 5696801
http://www.filozofia.uksw.edu.pl/node/124



Pliki do pobrania:

» Pilat.pdf


  1. ISSN 0860-8024
  2. The Republic of Poland Ministry of Science and Higher Education Value: 20.00
  3. Quarterly “Ethos” is indexed by the following databases: EBSCO, CEEOL, Index Copernicus (ICV 2017: 55.26), Philosopher’s Index, ERIH Plus.
  4. DOI Prefix 10.12887