

MADNESS

ABSTRACTS

FROM THE EDITORS – Between Illness and Metaphor (M.Ch.)

Throughout the history of culture madness has been viewed in various ways, not infrequently in ones radically opposing each other. It used to be considered as an illness distorting the person’s cognitive contact with the reality, but also as a condition enabling super-perception and openness to the realms normally inaccessible to the human mind. On other occasions, madness was believed to be a consequence either of indulgence, unrestricted gratification of instinctual drives and excessive emotions, or, on the contrary, of repressing passions. Some believed it to be an outcome of trespass, a punishment for the sins one has committed, but again, in other instances, it was perceived as the manifestation of a received grace. In his scrutiny of madness, Michel Foucault repeatedly observes that its understanding exhibits much more incoherence than the understanding of any other phenomenon.¹

Madness conceived of as mental illness or, in a still broader sense, as mental disorder, was also explained in diverse ways—the scope of its interpretations encompasses strictly biological standpoints in which madness is perceived as a pathology of the nervous system, as well as humanistic approaches, pointing to the social and cultural origins of madness rather than to its organic roots. Persons diagnosed with mental disorders were considered to be disabled and, in their insanity, a threat to the ‘healthy’ environs. On the other hand, some saw in them individuals adequately responding to the degenerate and conformist society. Antoni Kępiński, a renowned Polish psychiatrist, dedicated one of his most important works to “those who feel more than others and have a different understanding of things, and who thus suffer more, and are frequently called schizophrenics.”²

A radical position on the issue of insanity was taken by the followers of the 20th century intellectual movement called antipsychiatry who denied the very existence of mental illnesses. They strongly protested against stigmatization of people considered to be mentally ill and criticized involuntary hospitali-

¹ See Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, transl. by Richard Howard (London–New York: Routledge 2001), 111-150.

² Antoni Kępiński, *Schizofrenia* (Warszawa: Państwowy Zakład Wydawnictw Lekarskich, 1981), 13.

zation as well as invasive therapies, including pharmacological ones. While the opinions formulated by the proponents of antipsychiatry, particularly their radical postulates, can hardly be taken as legitimate, their true significance lies in that they pointed to the normative aspect of psychiatry and demanded that psychiatric patients be considered as rightful members of the society, deserving its full respect. Absolute isolation of the mentally ill had been common in the 17th through the 19th centuries, but the 20th century witnessed such tragic phenomena as extermination of the mentally ill in the times of Nazism or Soviet repressive psychiatry.

The existence of mad or insane persons poses a problem for the philosophical anthropology which defines the human being as *animal rationale*. If rationality is to be the defining characteristic of humanity, a distortion of rationality or its serious limitation would mean that individuals affected by such condition are either less human or—should their illness be grave—cannot be called human. Among the consequences of such a position might be a justified marginalization of the mentally ill, as well as depriving them of the rights belonging to all the human beings.

However, the personalist anthropology which refers to classical philosophy succeeds in overcoming this problem by making a clear distinction between the ontic structure of the human person and the person's functioning.³ Thus, it is held, a limitation or distortion of the functions a person fulfills does not disturb the person's ontic structure. Therefore mental disorders, even of a serious kind, which result in grave dysfunction of the person's rationality or self-consciousness, and which distort the person's experience of self as a subject, the person's self-determination, responsibility and participation in the human community, do not deprive the person of her structural characteristics, since they are merely contingent and may be overcome, whether it be in the temporal dimension, after an adequate therapy has been applied, or in the eschatological perspective. Distortions and disturbances of this kind do not affect the core of humanity, which lies in the person's likeness to the Creator, reflected precisely in the personal structure of the human being. Thus a mentally ill person preserves "the incomparable value of the human being created by God to be a son in the Son."⁴ Another name for this value, which belongs to each and every human being, is 'human dignity': this dignity is nonforfeitable and independent of the functioning of the person's intellect, reason, volition or the spheres of emotions and biological drives. There is also a normative aspect to this dignity, namely, it demands affirmation of each and every person without any exception, simply for the sake of the person. "The duty to affirm a human person for the sake of the person's dignity is unconditional and unequivocal, and thus categorical, whereas the act of the affirmation of a person ... radiates a selflessness that gives this act

³ See Wojciech Chudy, "Człowiek niepełnosprawny w świetle filozofii," *Ethos* 20, issue 3-4 (79-80) (2007), 68f.

⁴ "Message of John Paul II on the occasion of the International Symposium on the Dignity and Rights of the Mentally Disabled Persons," Vatican, 5 January 2004, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2004/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20040108_handicap-mentale.html.

a special splendor characteristic of the specifically moral value also called 'fairness.'"⁵ It then follows that not only discrimination of the mentally ill and non-humanitarian attitudes towards them, but also any instances of disregarding their inherent dignity must be considered unfair.

In the modern times mental illnesses are only rarely referred to as 'madness.' As a matter of fact the term in question is a rather infrequent description and it is usually used in order to describe certain behaviors, in particular those related to a person's conduct or morality and conflicting with universally accepted norms. The concept of madness may have either a positive or a negative meaning: both criminals and heroes may be called 'mad.' Still, even if used in a positive context, the term 'mad' expresses a certain distance towards the behavior it describes. One might say that the motives or reactions to which the term 'madness' refers are to some extent considered as alien or incomprehensible. A person called 'mad' may be one whose hierarchy of values and commitment to them sharply diverge from the average social standards, as in the case of a missionary who refuses to leave his or her mission station despite a war going on, or a military commander who will not surrender his army despite the overwhelming power of the enemy. Such actions, while they might even inspire admiration, do not fall within the limits of 'normality.' Paradoxically, while the medical science finds extreme difficulty in delineating the norm of mental health, informal norms of behavior seem to be rather clear in this respect and are socially enforced.

On the one hand, a universal rejection of any norms would undoubtedly result in social anarchy, but on the other, if norms are to be perceived as the principal tool regulating human behavior, the consequence may be that of encouraging inauthentic attitudes in social life. Indeed, the pressure exerted on individuals for the sake of making them stay within the realm of 'normality,' together with the sanctions imposed on those who dissent, in particular recourse to various forms of social exclusion, not infrequently promote conformist attitudes. Moreover, it must not be overlooked that should the need to adapt to others not come from the persons' inner conviction, but from social coercion, and should it not encounter a rightful protest, the society will find itself reducing the self-determination of its members and refusing them free choice, which—speaking in the personalist terms—jeopardizes human self-transcendence.⁶

The globalized society characteristic of the modern civilization of the latest decades has, at its disposal, effective means to dictate particular norms of behavior, which is frequently done on commercial grounds (although apparently the range of the application of those norms may seem wide). Simultaneously one may have the impression that contemporary culture, marked by an increasingly difficult access to non-ideologized information, as well as by blurred concepts and various other pathologies, resembles a ship of fools sailing among the reefs

⁵ Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS, "Człowiek obrazem Miłości," in Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS, *Urodziłeś się, by kochać* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993), 30.

⁶ See Card, Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, transl. by Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht–Boston–London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 289–291.

of the reality towards an inevitable disaster, or maybe Bruegel's *Dull Gret*, yet one loaded no longer with kitchen utensils, but rather with electronic devices, and heading straight towards the mouth of the apocalyptic beast. Perhaps a remedy for this situation, as the principle of homeopathy would suggest, is precisely madness: one conceived of, metaphorically, as the courage to think independently, to adopt authentic attitudes and axiological radicalism.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

JOHN PAUL II – “At the Threshold of the Human Mystery” (trans. D. Chabrajska)

In his address to the members of the American Psychiatric Association and the World Psychiatric Association Pope John Paul II expressed the Church's esteem for the many physicians and health care professionals involved in the important and delicate area of psychiatric medicine. He stressed that their patient efforts to understand the conditions of general mental health and to provide care to those suffering from psychic disorders have an immense potential for good for individuals and for the life of society. The Pope added that psychiatric associations serve a valuable purpose in promoting high standards of scientific knowledge as well as a deep awareness of the professional and ethical requirements demanded by the practice of psychiatry.

While addressing the topic of psychiatry, the Pope said that the work to which psychiatrists have devoted themselves often brings them to the threshold of the human mystery. It involves a sensitivity to the often tangled workings of the human mind and heart, and an openness to the ultimate concerns which give meaning to people's lives. These are areas of utmost importance to the Church, and they call to mind the urgent need for a constructive dialogue between science and religion for the sake of shedding greater light on the mystery of man in its fullness. The Church's own history of commitment to caring for the sick, especially the poor and the emarginated, is rooted in the conviction that the human person is a unity of body and spirit, possessing an inviolable dignity as one made in the image of God and called to a transcendent destiny. For this reason, the Church is convinced that no adequate assessment of the nature of the human person or the requirements for human fulfillment and psycho-social well-being can be made without respect for man's spiritual dimension and capacity for self-transcendence. Only by transcending themselves and living a life of self-giving and openness to truth and love can individuals reach fulfillment and contribute to building an authentic human community.

John Paul II observed that psychiatric associations are rightly concerned to promote human dignity and the inviolability of individuals and of their freedom. The foundations of human dignity are to be found in the truth about man, and in his human freedom to form his instincts and passions according to the objective requirements of the moral order. As the Scriptures suggest, there is an unbreakable link between authentic freedom and truth (cf. Jn. 10:47); indeed, “freedom attains its full development only by accepting the truth” (John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus*, Section 46). It follows that no genuine therapy or

treatment for psychic disturbances can ever conflict with the moral obligation of the patient to pursue the truth and to grow in virtue. This moral component of the therapeutic task makes great demands upon psychiatrists, who must be committed to attaining a more adequate grasp of the truth of their own lives and to showing profound respect for the dignity of their patients.

Psychiatrists must also feel themselves responsible for the social ramifications of their practice. This is especially true today, when there is ever more clearly a relationship between the appearance and aggravation of certain illnesses and mental disturbances and the crisis of values which society is experiencing. The Pope expressed the conviction that members of psychiatric associations will make an important contribution to the future of society by seeking to point out, in the light of a dispassionate commitment to truth, the limits of certain models of social life which can lead to the manipulation of persons and to an unhealthy conditioning of human freedom. He emphasized the inherent value present in the psychiatrists' work to overcome the stigma which has often been associated with mental illness, to end the abuse of psychiatry for ideological reasons, and to strengthen the family as the basic unit of society. He also expressed his deep appreciation of their efforts to draw society's attention to the special needs of the poor, the homeless and the abused. He assured the gathered of the Church's appreciation and ready cooperation in this work. Concluding his address the Pope said that the task of healing others and ensuring their psycho-social equilibrium is indeed important and delicate and it involves not only scientific knowledge, but also great wisdom.

Summarized by *Dorota Chabrajska*

Keywords: Catholic Church on psychiatry, mental illness, human dignity, human mystery, human fulfillment and psycho-social well-being, dialogue between science and religion, abuse of psychiatry, moral component of the therapeutic task, American Psychiatric Association, the World Psychiatric Association

Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Members of the American Psychiatric Association and the World Psychiatric Association, delivered in the Vatican on 4 January 1993.

For the complete text of the address in English, see *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II*, vol. 16 (1993), part 1, p. 13-15.

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Fr. Grzegorz STRZELCZYK – Theology as Madness

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The present article is devoted to the analysis of some aspects of Christian theology which may render it as 'madness' in the sense of 'conduct going beyond accepted norms, and customs.' The sources of the 'going beyond' in question are located in the teaching and activity of Jesus (which was perceived

as madness already by some of his contemporaries), and this transgression has been continued in the dogmatic interpretations of his identity (especially in the doctrine of the Trinity and incarnation). The theology based on them makes claims to the ability to get to know God (albeit with a series of reservations), which in turn may be interpreted as madness in the contemporary context. Moreover, transgression against deep-rooted epistemological or religious attitudes leads in some cases to attitudes which may be identified as 'mad.' However, it seems that in those signs of madness, simultaneously, the most meaningful and vivid intuitions are revealed, and they determine the originality of the Christian identity and, in consequence, the originality of Christian theology.

Keywords: theology, madness

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Fr. Dariusz DZIADOSZ – The Madness of Saul: Insanity, Possession or a Political Plot?

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The motif of madness certainly does not belong among the leading themes of the Hebrew Bible. The Old Testament texts approach the question of madness and insanity with great caution, as if the inspired authors realized the complexity of the phenomena in question and were aware of their supernatural origin. The Bible usually speaks negatively about madness, attributing this term to human behaviors and attitudes which are described today as psychological, emotional, and depressive disorders, as well as spiritual ones, such as being possessed. Every instance of a disturbed balance of mind or personality is seen in the Bible as a result of the working of the hand of God, who has decided to influence the life of a particular individual for reasons he only knows. The tragic story of Saul, the first king of Israel, provides a perfect illustration of this theological truth despite its being presented in many different ways by different historical-Biblical sources.

The present article describes selected social, political, literary and theological aspects of the Biblical personality of the son of Kish, as seen from the perspective of his apparent madness, his being rejected and his final suicide.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

Keywords: madness in the Bible, Saul, David, First Book of Samuel, madness, the spirit of YAHWEH

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Bartłomiej BRAŹKIEWICZ – Ceasing to Be in order to Be: Holy Fools in the Apophatic Anthropology Perspective

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The Eastern Orthodox Church tends to cautiously formulate positive doctrinal statements. Its preferred method is the apophatic one, emphasizing what is not the nature of being (especially in terms of true understanding of God) or what is not the case rather than speaking of it with absolute conviction. However, exceptions to this rule do appear, particularly considering the justification of human nature in reference to theological anthropology. All cataphatic statements regarding human existence are being derived from both the Old and New Testament. Still, limited in understanding the divine, describing the creation of human beings in the image and likeness of God indicates the way of theosis. Fulfilling the potential to become more like God means in practice acting harmoniously with divine purposes while providing no absolute normative solution. It is clear that this approach is highly esteemed in Eastern Orthodox ethics, appearing to be contradiction between moral legalism and truly Christian way of living. Within Orthodox Christianity a distinctive form of asceticism called holy foolishness had been developed, especially in Russia, where the yurodivy adopting a specific form of behavior intentionally denies world's respectability and paradoxically rejects any rule for moral purposes. As described in the present paper, the most prominent examples of Russian holy fools, among them Isaac the Recluse, Procopius of Ustyug, Michael of Klopsk, Basil the Blessed, Simon of Yuryevets, Xenia of Saint Petersburg and Ivan Koreysha, applied the idea of holy foolishness in order to shame and depreciate the wise and the wealthy. Pointing out their illusive splendor, revealed in sanity, was consistent with the negative method of achieving unity with God.

Keywords: holy fool, Russian culture, orthodox Christian culture, orthodox Christian anthropology

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Krzysztof LEŚNIEWSKI – The Holy Fools in the Tradition of Eastern Christianity
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The ‘holy fools’ or the ‘fools for Christ’ serve God under the guise of foolishness. In the life of the Church they represent the most extreme and extraordinary way of obeying the Gospel preaching about overturning and rejecting individual morality. The holy fools were usually monks and radical ascetics who came down into the ‘world,’ into the cities. In ‘Christian’ society they performed strange and senseless actions—the actions of madness. Their way of life reveals to ordinary Christians the truth of salvation through antics, jokes and absurdities. Their purpose was to remind us that the Gospel message is ‘foolishness’ and that salvation and sanctity cannot be reconciled with the satisfaction that comes from the society’s respect and personal recognition. The article presents the holy fools as an interesting phenomenon in the spiritual tradition of Eastern Christianity. In its first part, there are depicted biblical roots of ‘holy foolishness,’ including references to the Old and the New Testaments. Then there is described the Byzantine foolishness, starting with the Egyptian desert. In the third part of the article the author concentrates on the Russian ‘iurodstvo,’ relating to some very famous saints. Apart from that there are also shown the main reasons, which are of great importance, for being the ‘holy fool,’ such as: humility, detachment from this world, and charity. The final part of the article features the most important presuppositions of foolishness for Christ.

Keywords: the Holy Fools, the Fools for Christ, Eastern Christian Ascetics, the Byzantine foolishness, the Russian iurodstvo

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Konrad BANICKI – Between Medicine and the Humanities: On Philosophy Struggling with the Concept of Mental Disorder
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Philosophy of psychiatry is a philosophical discipline focused on fundamental theoretical and conceptual issues in contemporary psychiatry. One of such issues is the so-called demarcation problem, which can be understood as the question about the difference between mental illness (mental disorder) and psychological functioning which is normal, or healthy. After a brief account of the standard criteria for such differentiation the dominant naturalistic (medical) understanding of psychiatry as well as the notion of mental illness proper to the latter (in the versions offered by Boorse and Wakefield) are subjected to scrutiny. Then, in turn, critical currents are investigated with their concept of psychiatry as a discipline of humanistic and normative character. Some of these currents, such

as the antipsychiatry of Szasz, are of historical importance today. Still, however, many threads are discussed, especially in the context of the notion of mental disorder developed by the American Psychiatric Association (the consecutive versions of the DSM diagnostic manual). One may expect that such discussions will be fruitfully carried on, especially in those cases when particular disorders (rather than ‘mental disorder as such’) are philosophically investigated.

Keywords: philosophy of psychiatry, mental illness, mental disorder, naturalism, the medical model of psychiatry, Szasz, Boorse, Wakefield, DSM

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Bartłomiej DOBROCZYŃSKI, Mira MARCINÓW – Where “the dark angel of madness has no means of entry.” An Essay on the Origin of the Idea of Culpable Insanity, as seen in the Context of 19th Century Poetry and Prose

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Since ancient times, the concept of culpable insanity has persisted in culture, based on the belief that the mentally ill are responsible for the onset of their illness. Among the factors that decisively influenced this idea were: ontological dualism, the main disputes in the 19th century psychiatry (e.g. the *Somatiker* versus *Psychiker* debate), the so-called moral treatment which appeared with the advent of romantic medicine, as well as some characteristics of the development of Western societies, discussed by Michel Foucault and René Girard. Simultaneously a few crucial events that took place in the development of science in the 19th and 20th centuries significantly contributed to the slow disappearance of the idea of the culpability of mental illness. These included: the theory of evolution, the growing popularity of monism and naturalism, the discovery of the unconscious and the emergence of psychoanalysis, as well as getting a better understanding of the role of environmental and emotional factors in the development of the human mind.

Keywords: history of ideas, psychopathology, culpable insanity

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Natalia STENCEL – “Jesus, are You my God or some kind of phantom?” On the Traces of Fear of Madness in the *Diary of Saint Maria Faustyna Kowalska*

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This article attempts to describe the signs of fear of madness in the *Diary of Saint Maria Faustyna Kowalska*. The author discusses the background against which fear of madness manifests itself in the mystical experience, the stage of the experience in question at which such fear may appear, as well as its causes. The question the author proceeds to answer is why the fear of madness a mystic experiences turns out so acute despite the grace of God he or she has apparently received.

The considerations are rooted to some extent in the achievements of the psychology of religion. However, a separate methodology is applied in the scrutiny of the matter of the text, the methodological framework being provided by selected ideas put forward by Steven T. Katz and Roland Barthes, particularly with reference to the ways in which subjectivity may be approached through textual analysis. Thus a mystic is considered primarily as the author of the text in which ‘traces’ and ‘remnants’ of the particular mystical experience have been left, barely mediating the experience itself.

Another issue discussed in the article is that of the mystic’s ‘inexpressibility’ and of his or her transgression of the language-based community.

The problem of fear of madness is additionally embedded in the Old and New Testament tradition which held that madness is a state of holiness.

Keywords: Saint Maria Faustyna Kowalska, madness, fear of madness, mysticism, mystical experience, textual analysis, diary studies, psychology of religion

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Jolanta ŚWIDEREK – A Wise Man, a Madman, an Ignorant Person, and a Fool: The Socratic Conception of Madness in the Light of the Writings of Xenophon

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The article, based on the writings of Xenophon, presents the Socratic conception of madness against the background of religious and Hippocratic approach. The philosopher characterizes madness with reference to wisdom, ignorance and stupidity. He portrays madness as a state in which the mind, which possesses practical knowledge needed for doing good, is limited by emotions and lust. Therefore, a madman deliberately chooses evil. Wisdom is a state in which the mind, which possesses practical knowledge needed for doing good, is unlimited by emotions and lust. Therefore a wise man deliberately chooses good. The philosopher described ignorance as a greater or lesser lack of essential knowledge for doing good. An ignorant person chooses evil unintentionally, whereas a madman chooses evil purposefully. In this approach, a madman is different

from a wise man in that he lacks temperance (*enkrateia*), while it is knowledge that distinguishes him from an ignorant person. Another state of mind selected by our philosopher is stupidity characterized by the lack of knowledge mentioned above and the lack of temperance. What links a madman in the religious approach with the Socratic ignorant person and a fool is the fact that they both lack the awareness, which plays a crucial role in making decisions when evaluating a given situation. According to the philosopher, it was the particular person that was responsible for madness, ignorance, stupidity and wisdom; the gaining of the suitable knowledge as well as the gaining of *enkrateia* depended entirely upon him, just like in the Hippocratic approach in which it was the particular person that was responsible for causing a disease as well as the recovery.

Keywords: madness, ignorance, wisdom, Socrates, Xenophon

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Danuta MUSIAŁ – ‘Dionysian madness,’ or On Madness and Emotions in Antique Religion

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Since the time of the publication of Michel Foucault’s book *Folie et Dérison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique* (1961) the concept of madness as a category of culture, variable in time and space, has been developing. Culture determines the boundaries transgression of which is considered as a mad behavior. In classical antiquity madness was believed to be a special kind of emotion (the others being: anger, fear, envy, pity, and hatred) sent on people by the gods (as in the case of Achilles’s anger or in that of Agave’s madness).

The Aeneid had an important role in the presentation of the patterns of madness in the Roman culture. Jupiter destined Rome to rule all nations provided that the Romans would end godless madness. The mad act that began the chain of events unfavorable to Rome was the crime committed by Romulus.

The subject of madness and emotions is developed in relation to the discussion of the cult of Dionysus. Apart from the poetic visions modelled on *The Bacchae* by Euripides, two descriptions of Dionysian rituals deserve special consideration. The first one is included in Livy’s report on the Bacchanalian Affair. The second Bacchic story is portrayed by Tacitus in his *Annals* and describes the ceremony organized by the empress Messalina.

Keywords: Roman religion, madness, emotion, Dionysus, Messalina

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Anna BUDZIAK – Reason Alone: The ‘Mad Scientist’ and the Nineteenth-century Discourse of Mental Illness

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This study regards the major figures that are representative of the motif of the mad scientist in British prose fiction in the 18th and 19th centuries, from Jonathan Swift’s ‘mad inventors’ to Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* to late Victorian vivisectionists. The essay has two foci. Firstly, it views literature and the discourses of mental illness as closely related. Thus, it describes the mental and temperamental aberrations of the literary ‘mad scientists’ with the terminology that was typical for the 19th century (including the notions of ‘melancholy,’ ‘monomania,’ ‘moral madness,’ or ‘dementia praecox’). It also seeks to show how writers reflected the changing approaches to madness, by emphasizing either moral or physiological aspects in the literary descriptions of the behaviour that was deemed mad (manic, obsessive, hysterical, apathetic or anti-social). The second focus of this essay is on various literary incarnations of the mad scientist and the cultural functions performed by such stereotypical depictions. The question, thus, is not only how madness was represented in literature, but also why scientists—in particular, doctors and psychiatrists—were presented by writers as mad. With a view to investigating this problem, this essay shows how writers responded to a range of dilemmas arising when medical, physiological and neurological researches were conducted. It proposes to see these problems as grouped within three categories: the concern with loneliness, isolation and cognitive solipsism (1), the problem of cruel curiosity, or ‘epistemophilia,’ manifesting itself in maniac vivisectionism (2), and the issue of the materialistic explanations of psychological and mental illnesses (3). Taking into consideration the literary tradition from Swift to Wells, and its criticism, this essay shows regularities and links in the development of the motif of the mad scientist. In its conclusion, in agreement with the explanation provided by Anne Stiles, this study stresses that, while seeking to provide a moral critique of science, literature, perhaps inadvertently, stigmatized the scientist.

Keywords: *Gulliver’s Travels*, *Rasselas*, *Frankenstein*, or the *New Prometheus*, Victorian novel, 19th-century psychiatry in Great Britain, alienists, vivisection, the motif of the mad scientist

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Janusz JUSIAK – The Ethos of Music and the Determinism of Art
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The article discusses selected problems resulting from the impossibility of attributing to the art of music a system of ideas and values, traditionally described as the ethos of music, that would be independent of the specificity of music as such. In the opening part of the paper some arguments are put forward to support the thesis that the concept of the ethos of art is itself ambiguous and not entirely coherent with its common explanations. Moreover, the concept in question is subject to change in history, depending on the intellectual climate of a given epoch and the prevalent views on the sense of artistic creativity and its value for a human individual, the issue being particularly significant in the case of the ethos of music. The issue in question is discussed in detail on the example of the two most frequently brought up conceptions of music, namely, the romantic idealist and the organic rationalist ones, the latter having originated in ancient Greece. The article further discusses the working of certain causal influences on music and musical creativity, in particular those which seem directly bound to the music itself and which provide its either external or internal descriptions, being determinants of art rather than determinants of music as such. The author concludes by putting forward the thesis that the submission of music to the dictate of certain powers which either reside outside its specific field or are generated by it is a phenomenon that results in a paradox. Yet disregarding this paradox would be a misguided step, tantamount to ignoring the consequences of some facts discussed in the article.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajka*

Keywords: problem of the ethos of music, ethos of art, romantic idealist conception of music, organic rationalist conception of music, determinants of art, determinants of music

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Adam ORGANISTY – *Furia della figura* as a Metaphor for the “Living Flame of Love,” as seen in the Silesian Baroque Sculpture

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The article discusses Silesian Baroque sculptures in Kamieniec Ząbkowicki (Kamenz), Henryków (Heinrichau) and in Ziębice (Münsterberg). Despite workshop differences the works in question have a similar dramatic effect. In German literature the specificity of these sculptures has been explained by the

particular cultural situation of the region of Silesia and the influence of the spirit of fancy (*Schwärmergeist*), a religious mood marked by 'divine madness.' However, art historians focusing on the study of sculpture tend to criticize the ideas bearing the stigma of pre-war paradigms, and instead consider these works as instances of expressive sculpture. Yet even such a description does not enable a reading of the formal patterns used in the discussed Silesian sculptures as principal carriers of meaning.

The statues of the Pope in Henryków and Saint Eustace in Kamieniec Żabkowicki, both showing a spiral curl of the body, demonstrate a reference to neo-mannerist compositional principles characteristic of the art of the turn of the 18th century. They depict 'the most restless form of all forms,' namely that of a dancing flame (*furia della figura*). The 'living flame of love,' described by St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa of Jesus, informs also St. Bernrad's of Clairvaux 'school of heavenly philosophy.' The inspiration for the expressive Silesian sculptures may have come not only from G.L. Bernini's *The Ecstasy of Saint Teresa*, but also, and above all, from the writings of the Saint Carmelite nun. Indeed, according to Gian Paolo Lomazzo, who belongs among the most important theorists of mannerist art, the shape of the flame of fire (*forma della fiamma del foco*) was the best means to depict 'the fury of the figure' (*furia della figura*), incorporated in the 'pyramid-shaped coil' (*piramidale, serpentinata*).

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: Silesian Baroque sculpture, expressive sculpture, Thomas Weisfeldt, the 'spirit of fancy' (*Schwärmergeist*), *figura serpentinata*, *furia della figura*, mysticism, Cistercians, Carmelites, living flame of love

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Zofia ZARĘBIANKA – On the Kinds and Functions of Biblical Signals in Karol Wojtyła's Poetry: A Reconnaissance

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The article comprises a typology of the Biblical signals present in Karol Wojtyła's poetic oeuvre. It also describes the artistic means used in his poetry in order to spell out these signals in the particular poetic texts. It has been demonstrated that the Biblical motifs present in Wojtyła's poems are not direct, rather, they mastermind the reading of a particular text, providing a situational, contextual or image-like background, enabling the identification of Biblical signs in the lyrical discourse. The obviousness of Biblical inspiration for Karol Wojtyła's poetic texts, once confronted with a weak representation of the full-scale Biblical motifs in his poetry, produces a specific tension, which is a significant element of Karol Wojtyła's poetic diction. It results, on the one hand, in the universality of the message of his poetry and, on the other, in the creation of

a double addressee of his poems and in the potential for their sense being read on many various levels.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

Keywords: Karol Wojtyła's poetry, Biblical motifs in poetry, Biblical inspiration in literary works, ways of poetry reading, the addressee of poetry

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Patrycja MIKULSKA – The Body and Its Meaning

The author discusses two books related to John Paul II's theology of the body: *Corpo e trascendenza. L'antropologia filosofica nella teologia del corpo di Giovanni Paolo II* ["Body and Transcendence. Philosophical Anthropology in the Theology of the Body of John Paul II"] by Jarosław Merecki, SDS, and *Teologiczna semantyka ciała* ["Theological Semantics of Sex"] by Jarosław Kupczak, OP. The former presents the philosophical presuppositions of the theological theory of the human body, while the latter focuses on the problems related to the use of sexual metaphors in theology. The author also formulates critical remarks concerning both monographs, pointing to the insufficient treatment of the fundamental concept of experience, and especially of the question of the relationship between philosophy and theology, with their underlying theories of experience, and the particular instances of experience of individuals.

Keywords: theology of the body, philosophical anthropology, concept of experience, John Paul II, sexual metaphors in theology

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Bronisław JAKUBIEC, SDS – The Memory of Very Nice Encounters: An Essay on Prince Adam Tadeusz Czartoryski, and Some of His Letters

The paper comprises the author's reminiscences of his meetings with Prince Adam Tadeusz Czartoryski (1909-2006), a grandson of Adam Konstanty Czartoryski and Elżbieta née Działyńska, and a son of Tomasz Bogusław Czartoryski and Zofia Klementyna née Lubomirska.

The author met Adam Tadeusz Czartoryski while studying for the priesthood in the Major Salvatorian Seminary in Bagno, where Czartoryski was Professor of Latin and Greek, and his teacher from 1976 to 1979. It was then that their acquaintance began and turned into a long-lasting friendship.

The present reminiscences open with an unpublished so far short story entitled "A Livery Button," written by the author in 1981, after a visit to Czartoryski's house. The short story not only renders the unique atmosphere of the conversation which had just taken place, but also describes the situation of many Poles harmed by the unjust political reality of the after-war period.

The second part of the reminiscences comprises eleven letters the author received from Adam Tadeusz Czartoryski from 1987 to 1995 which have survived in his personal archives. The letters portray some aspects of the life in Poland during the period when the communist system was in decline, and new prospects for the country were beginning to emerge. However, apart from outlining the situation, Adam Tadeusz Czartoryski's letters show his immense knowledge, his broad interests and his unique personal culture.

The inspiration for the present paper was the dedication Prince Adam Tadeusz Czartoryski wrote on the lithography which he presented to the author and in which he asked for "memory of very nice encounters."

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

Keywords: Adam Tadeusz Czartoryski, Polish aristocracy, after-war history of the Polish aristocracy, the history of the Kórnik castle, social problems in the Poland of the 1980's and the 1990's

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Karol GRZECHNIK – On the Role of Kerygma in Literary Research

Review of Jarosław Borowski, Edward Fiała, Ireneusz Piekarski (eds.), *Interpretacja kerygmaticzna. Doświadczenia – re-wizje – perspektywy* [Keyrgetic Interpretation: The Experiences, the Re-Visions, the Prospects] (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2014).

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Paweł PRÜFER – On the Interpenetration of Morality and Society

Review of Janusz Mariański's *Moralność w kontekście społecznym* [Morality in the Social Context] (Kraków: Zakład Wydawniczy Nomos, 2014).

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Mitchell WELLE – How to Conceive of the Good, or On the Unpredicted Consequences of the Reformation

Review of Brad Gregory's *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).

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Books recommended by *Ethos*

Krzysztof Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią* [Normative Ethics: Between Consequentialism and Deontology] (Kraków: Universitas, 2015).

Piotr Duchliński, Dariusz Dańkowski, SJ (eds.), *W kręgu etyki klasycznej. Inspiracje i kontynuacje. Prace dedykowane Profesorowi Tadeuszowi Ślipce z okazji 95. rocznicy urodzin* [Within the Circle of Classical Ethics: Inspirations and Continuations: Festschrift for Professor Tadeusz Ślipko on His 95th Birthday] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2015).

Jakub TERCZ – Philosophy in Pursuit of the Proper Language for Psychiatry

Report on the Second Open Philosophical-Psychiatric Seminar “Norm / Pathology,” Museum of Modern Art, Warsaw, 20 June 2015.

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Adam FITAS – A Man—A Story

Report on a conference “Tangling the Interpretation: Professor Władysław Panas (1947-2005) in Memoriam,” John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland, 23 January 2015.

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Patrycja MIKULSKA – Hic Sunt Dracones

A feuilleton, inspired by the author’s voyage to Ukraine, on the presence of various manifestations of evil in the human history and on the resistance against them.

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Maria FILIPIAK – Popes John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis Speak on the Suffering of the Human Body, Mind and Soul

A Bibliography of the Addresses of Popes John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis from the Years 1978 to 2015

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