From the Editors – Between Harm and Wrong (D.Ch.)

The Polish term ‘krzywda,’ rendered here as ‘wrong,’ is by no means easy either to define or to translate into English.\(^1\) Although the condition it describes appears absolutely real and indisputable, almost tangible in the human experience, a philosophical insight into it, an attempt to find a metacategory with which to approach it, or one to provide its analysis using general concepts characteristic of philosophy rather than a description of particular instances of ‘wrong,’ turns out an intellectually backbreaking endeavor. While perfectly capable of pointing to particular cases of ‘wrong’ and having no doubts about our recognition, we find it extremely difficult to speak of wrong-doing (or of being wronged) in metalanguage. Perhaps one of the reasons of this stunning intellectual impotence is that the expression ‘wrong’ conveys a borderline and cross-disciplinary concept, functioning in such fields of study as psychology, philosophy, ethics, (philosophical and cultural) anthropology, metaphysics, theology, and even sociology (after all we do speak about social wrongs). Therefore, an aspectual analysis of the notion of ‘wrong’ as such inevitably results in reductionism, in a radical simplification of what we otherwise believe to be a very deep existential experience which, not infrequently, determines the entire life of a person.\(^2\)

\(^1\) The Polish word ‘krzywda’ does not have a one-to-one word correspondence in English, the source language for modern philosophy. None of the English words used to render the phenomenon and experience denoted by the term ‘krzywda’ (e.g. ‘harm,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘injustice,’ ‘injury,’ ‘hurt,’ ‘ill,’ or ‘abuse,’ to enumerate only the phrases most frequently recurring in such contexts) conveys the intuition of an evil (whether in the subjective or in the objective sense) exerting a lasting influence on the subject, as if leaving an unremovable imprint on her being. Neither does English have a direct synonym of the German term ‘Schadenfreude.’ The latter fact was referred to by Adam Potkay in his talk “A Very Short History of Joy” delivered at the seminar “Of Joy” held by the John Paul II Institute at the Catholic University of Lublin on 7 April 2011. Potkay said: “Speakers of English have on occasion taken some comfort in the fact that we have no native expression for this sentiment: the Oxford English Dictionary lists among the term’s earliest uses in English this philological reflection from a 1927 Spectator: ‘There is no English word for schadenfreude because there is no such feeling here.’” So, can one reason—by way of analogy—and come to the conclusion that the concept and experience of ‘wrong’ in the sense it has assumed in the Polish language does not occur among the native users of English?

\(^2\) In Polish philosophy, an attempt at a systematic approach to the concept of ‘wrong’ and the related concept of ‘compensation’ can be found in a book by Robert Piłat. See Robert Piłat, Krzywda i zadośćuczynienie (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, 2003).
The concept of ‘wrong’ is definitely part of a broader concept of ‘evil’. Yet the experience of ‘wrong’ proves false the popular saying that every cloud has a silver lining. A wrong does not have positive consequences, should it do so, it could not be called a wrong. It seems that speaking about positive consequences of a wrong (the so-called ‘silver linings’) might be true if referred to the condition we define by means of the term ‘harm,’ which also describes a certain type of evil, an objectively or subjectively grasped deficiency (also in the capacities of a human person) further consequences of which might turn out positive or at least neutral to all concerned. What is the difference between a wrong and a harm then? Can we point to the moment an evil stops being a harm, a deficiency which can be remedied (perhaps by some new quality), and becomes a wrong? In other words, can we point to the moment evil introduces an irreversible change in human relations or in the relation of a human being to the world and nothing is like it was before? What happens ‘between harm and wrong’? These questions—although a methodologist might easily find them imprecise and see in them instances of circular thinking or demands for an explanation involving still another logical fallacy, namely *ignotum per ignotius*—may nevertheless be answered. Perhaps in the case of the concept of ‘wrong,’ rather than provide a definition, it is more important to point to some marks of the essence of the idea it grasps, to offer a so-called ostensive definition. One must nevertheless bear in mind that a definition of this kind will be, even at its best, merely outlined and that, in the sense of logic, it may provide only a reductionist explanation of the source phenomenon.

Our endeavor turns out even more difficult since wrongs tend to remain unrecognized or simply overlooked. While it is true that occasionally the wronged ones cry for justice or, so to speak, for a better lot, this aspect of ‘wrong’—despite its being appalling—is less interesting to a philosopher. One might risk saying that while trying to understand the ‘mass aspect’ of ‘wrong,’ for instance the experience of whole nations and generations disadvantaged by history, or of social classes and social groups demanding respect for their rights and fighting discrimination, we overlook the individual experience of a wronged person. For instance, the horror of the second world war is rendered much better by the character of a little boy in Leon Kruczkowski’s play *Germans* (a boy to whom it was important that his name was ‘little Chaim,’ although he was just about to be executed⁴) than by pointing to the number of human lives destroyed in the war’s mass killings. On the other hand, wrong, if considered in its mass aspect, appears simply a kind of social harm which may—and which must—be compensated. A philosopher, on her part, will rather ask about what ‘happens’ to a person who is being wronged, or to a person who has been wronged, or she will indeed ask about the moment a wrong actually begins to affect the human being. This latter question addresses something that remains in a sense opaque to an objective observer—and it is precisely due to their opacity that wrongs are frequently overlooked, that they as if ‘escape’ our perception. A reason may be that wrong-doing does not always result from violence, but it may simply be

³ See ibidem, 29f.
a consequence of inadequate attention, of a lack of subtlety, of an egocentric attitude or of ignorance. It may occur because a human being did not understand something, did not think of something or showed an inadequate sensibility, or an inadequate intelligence. She may have had no bad intentions, she may have had no good intentions, she may have had no intentions at all, but her actions hit the vulnerability, the inner ‘nakedness’ of another person in some aspect, they caused a wound that would not heal. It seems that what determines the fact that we are no longer dealing with harm, but with an instance of wrong, is precisely the depth of the wound and its permanence. The wound may have affected the person’s feelings or attitudes, such as faith, trust or hope, but it may have affected also the person’s memory. Regardless of its object though the wound will never fully heal. Interestingly, even though all her further life will be marked by this particular experience, a person affected by wrong does not necessarily realize the wound, she does not necessarily realize that the feelings she has experienced, or even brokenness, actually result from her having been wronged.

Karol Wojtyła analyzes intransitive consequences of human action, or, in other words, intransitive consequences of human efficacy, pointing out that with every action of hers a human being either uplifts or destroys herself. An action is a specific reality, as if a sediment that will always remain ‘within’ the human being, and it is impossible for a person to relinquish her efficacy. However, it seems that the phenomenon of ‘wrong’ makes us sensitive to the existence, in the human being, of a dimension that is in a way parallel to efficacy, namely, that of receptivity. Just as the actions a human being performs have either an edifying power or a damaging one, the human being is either edified or damaged by what she endures. A wrong—a wound that will not heal regardless of whether a given person is aware of having been actually wounded—inevitably marks her way of thinking and acting; it inevitably marks also her decisions and thus, by way of feedback, affects her efficacy, and through her efficacy, the entirety of her existence. And it is not that we are dealing here with a simple and predictable attitude: it is not true that the deeper the wrong affecting a person, the more insensitive (or, conversely, the more sensitive) the person becomes. Instead, the experience of having been wronged is in some sense tantamount to permanent inner suffering and loneliness which turns out impossible to overcome: a state that, as if a cocoon, wraps up the entirety of the existence of an individual in question.

A state like this was impressively grasped by Sándor Márai in his depiction of the main character of his novel *Embers*: a man whose best friend—in their youth—took his wife away from him, and—for a moment—wished to kill him. Although the love between his friend and his wife did not survive, although the murder was ultimately not attempted, and the woman died soon afterwards, the “General”—as the author calls him—lived many years contemplating only these two things. In fact all his life—marked by the wrong he experienced as

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a result of having lost both his wife and his friend—was reduced to waiting for a confrontation with the latter7 and for the final question he then asked: “And . . . if we have experienced this much, then perhaps we haven’t lived in vain?”8 This heroic effort at a rational grasp of wrong-doing and being wronged, at ‘taming the wrong,’ so to speak, undertaken by both men ‘at eternity’s gate,’ was preceded by a dialogue in which questions turned our more important than answers and which did not produce any resolution, and merely confirmed the irreversibility of the wrong that had put the two friends apart. “Such is the force of human nature—it must provide or receive an answer to whatever is the defining question of a lifetime,”9 says the General. “At the end of our lives, what do truth and falsehood count, or deceit, betrayal, attempted murder, or actual murder, or the question of where, when, and how often my wife, the love and hope of my life, betrayed me with my closest friend? . . . What is fidelity, what do we expect of the woman we love? . . . When we demand fidelity, are we wishing for the other person’s happiness? And if that person cannot be happy in the subtle prison of fidelity, do we really prove our love by demanding fidelity nonetheless? And if we do not love that person in a way that makes her happy, do we have the right to expect fidelity or any other sacrifice?,”10 he wonders, and bitterly sums up his experience. “Self-respect is the irreplaceable foundation of our humanity; wound it, and the hurt, the damage, is so scalding that not even death can ease that torture.”11

Apart from a ‘wrong’ which has left permanent suffering and loneliness in its wake, Márai describes, in Esther’s Inheritance12 a wrong that results from exploiting an inner vulnerability of the human being, a vulnerability that, in this particular case, was an implication of the main heroine’s inner goodness and of her love for Lajos, whose life was „given over to an exacting kind of idleness.”13 Lajos had the ability to make others emotionally dependent on him, „he always spoke as if reading from a book,”14 „simply wanted to be involved wherever power was being distributed,”15 and told truth as eloquently and equally convincingly as was telling the opposite. “Lajos was a disciple of Nietzsche, who demanded that one should live dangerously.”16 “Life has been extraordinarily kind to me, and, just as extraordinarily, it has robbed me of everything,”17 says Esther. “We are bound to our enemies, nor

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7 “A man who has signed away his soul and his fate to solitude is incapable of faith. He can only wait. For the day or the hour when he can talk about everything that forced him into solitude with the man or men who forced him into that condition. He prepares himself for that moment for ten or forty or forty-one years the way one prepares for a duel,” confesses the General (ibidem, 121).
8 Ibidem, 296.
9 Ibidem, 212f.
10 Ibidem, 219f.
11 Ibidem, 223.
13 Ibidem, 33.
14 Ibidem, 36.
15 Ibidem, 37.
16 Ibidem, 45.
17 Ibidem, 4.
can they escape us,”\textsuperscript{18} she adds. In fact, Lajos cast a shadow on all her life, one might say he took everything from her: her estate, the possibility of getting married, the hope to love someone else, and even her good name, since he made her a suspect of theft, even though it was him who had committed it. When, years later, Lajos returns, a preposterous idea comes up that “perhaps he wants to settle his debts,”\textsuperscript{19} but Esther already knows that his arrival is an imminent danger, no different from those she already knew. Still she accepts the prospect as her lot and, looking back at her past, says, “Now that this danger has passed I can see that nothing is as it was, and that such danger was in fact the one true meaning of life.”\textsuperscript{20} So, she can see a meaning in the wrong done to her, a certain order, or even harmony, much as it might denote acceptance of her helplessness in confrontation with evil. She believes this is the reason why Lajos, being a danger, nevertheless no longer has power over her. “After a certain time has passed between people it is impossible to ‘put anything right’…. One lives and patches, improves, constructs, or, occasionally, ruins one’s life, but after a while one notices that whatever has been so compounded of errors and accidents is quite unique,” thinks Esther\textsuperscript{21}. And then it turns out that even the pain she has already experienced is incapable of killing hope in her, and that, once she confronting the only man she has ever loved, this hope once again makes her vulnerable.

He came back to me and looked deep into my eyes. He remained silent for a long time. We gazed at each other under half-closed eyelids, carefully and curiously. His expression was solemn now, devout.

‘One question, Esther,’ he said quietly and solemnly. ‘Just one question.’

I closed my eyes, feeling hot and dizzy. The dizziness lasted a few moments ... My god, he wants to ask me something. But what? Maybe he wants to know how the whole thing happened? Whether it was I who lacked courage? No, now I have to answer. I took a deep breath, ready to answer his question.

‘Tell me, Esther,’ he asked quietly, soulfully. ‘Does this house still have a mortgage?’\textsuperscript{22}

This time Lajos has arrived to persuade Esther to give him her house—and he reached his goal.

The anatomy of harm described by Márai may be supplemented with the case Albert Camus brings up in an essay entitled “Irony.”\textsuperscript{23} Also in this case the wrong results from a ‘wounded hope,’ but—unlike in the situations described by the Hungarian writer—in this literary as well as philosophical text, we are dealing with the dimension of ‘wrong’ which is easy to overlook. Camus writes about an old and ill woman. One side of her body had been paralyzed.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibidem, 47.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibidem, 45.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibidem, 65.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibidem, s. 69f.
“Only half of her was in this world while the other was already foreign to her. This bustling, chattering old lady had been reduced to silence and immobility. Alone day after day, illiterate, not very sensitive, her whole life was reduced to God. She believed in him. The proof is that she had a rosary, a lead statue of Christ, and a stucco statue of Saint Joseph carrying the infant Jesus. One day someone did pay attention to her. A young man. He had become genuinely interested in the old woman’s boredom. She felt it. She was eager to talk about her troubles. Did she get bored? Of course she did. No one spoke to her. Better to be done with it once and for all. She would sooner die than be a burden to anyone.”

The young man, who was a visitor in that house, had dinner with the hosts, and during the meal it was decided that they would all go to the cinema afterwards. There was no question of the old woman’s going with them. “She was in her corner, vacantly absorbed in the beads of her rosary.” Before leaving they came to say goodbye to her. “She had already realized what was happening and was clutching her rosary tightly in her hand. But it was plain this showed as much despair as zeal. Everyone else had kissed her. Only the young man was left. He had given her an affectionate handshake and was already turning away. But she saw that the one person who had taken an interest in her was leaving. She didn’t want to be alone. She could already feel the horror of loneliness. She was afraid … clinging to the one person who had shown an interest in her, held on to his hand, squeezing it, clumsily thanking him. The young man was embarrassed. He felt confronted by the most atrocious suffering he had ever known: that of a sick old woman just left behind by people going to the cinema.”

Literary works, also philosophical literary works, make it possible then to forge an imperfect, always incomplete ostensive definition of ‘wrong.’ Although this definition leaves much to be desired, it seems to point to the moment when ‘wrong’ enters human experience, when a wound that will never scar up is made. Although the factual content of this moment is different in every case, it always involves a confrontation of a subjectivity, and its expectation to be treated as such, with its, whether conscious or unconscious, objectification on the part of the wrong-doer.

The papers collected in the present volume address various aspects of ‘wrong’ and ‘wrong-doing,’ as well as their implications. Among other issues, the authors discuss the feeling of guilt, the need for forgiveness, and the need for retaliation and compensation. By pointing to various contexts in which wrongs appear, they show in detail what happens ‘between harm and wrong,’ and they demonstrate that despite its vagueness the concept of ‘wrong’ has an autonomous meaning both in philosophical anthropology and in philosophical ethics.

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24 Ibidem, 19f.
26 Ibidem, 21f.
JOHN PAUL II – “A Commitment to the Most Needy”

It is a great consolation for the universal Father to note that you come together here not as a symposium of experts, not as a parliament of politicians, not as a congress of scientists or technologists, however important such assemblies may be, but as a fraternal encounter of Pastors of the Church. And as Pastors you have the vivid awareness that your principal duty is to be Teachers of the Truth. Not a human and rational truth, but the Truth that comes from God, the Truth that brings with it the principle of the authentic liberation of man: “You will know the truth, and the truth will make you free” (Jn 8:32); that Truth which is the only one that offers a solid basis for an adequate ‘praxis’…. In fact, today there occur in many places—the phenomenon is not a new one—‘re-readings’ of the Gospel, the result of theoretical speculations rather than authentic meditation on the word of God and a true commitment to the Gospel. They cause confusion by diverging from the central criteria of the faith of the Church, and some people have the temerity to pass them on, under the guise of catechesis, to the Christian communities.

In some cases either Christ’s divinity is passed over in silence, or some people in fact fall into forms of interpretation at variance with the Church’s faith. Christ is said to be merely a ‘prophet,’ one who proclaimed God’s Kingdom and love, but not the true Son of God, and therefore not the center and object of the very Gospel message.

In other cases people claim to show Jesus as politically committed, as one who fought against Roman oppression and the authorities, and also as one involved in the class struggle. This idea of Christ as a political figure, a revolutionary, as the subversive man from Nazareth, does not tally with the Church’s catechesis. By confusing the insidious pretexts of Jesus’ accusers with the—very different—attitude of Jesus himself, some people adduce as the cause of his death the outcome of a political conflict, and nothing is said of the Lord’s will to deliver himself and of his consciousness of his redemptive mission. The Gospels clearly show that for Jesus anything that would alter his mission as the Servant of Yahweh was a temptation (cf. Mt 4:8; Lk 4:5). He does not accept the position of those who mixed the things of God with merely political attitudes (cf. Mt 22:21; Mk 12:17; Jn 18:36). He unequivocally rejects recourse to violence. He opens his message of conversion to everybody, without excluding the very Publicans. The perspective of his mission is much deeper. It consists in complete salvation through a transforming, peacemaking, pardoning and reconciling love. There is no doubt, moreover, that all this is very demanding for the attitude of the Christian who wishes truly to serve his least brethren, the poor, the needy, the emarginated; in a word, all those who in their lives reflect the sorrowing face of the Lord.

Against such ‘re-readings’ therefore, and against the perhaps brilliant but fragile and inconsistent hypotheses flowing from them, ‘evangelization in the present and future of Latin America’ cannot cease to affirm the Church’s faith: Jesus

27 See Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium, Section 8.
Christ, the Word and the Son of God, becomes man in order to come close to man and to offer him, through the power of his mystery, salvation, the great gift of God.28

This is the faith that has permeated your history and has formed the best of the values of your peoples and must go on animating, with every energy, the dynamism of their future. This is the faith that reveals the vocation to harmony and unity that must drive away the dangers of war in this continent of hope, in which the Church has been such a powerful factor of integration. This is the faith, finally, which the faithful people of Latin America through their religious practices and popular piety express with such vitality and in such varied ways.

From this faith in Christ, from the bosom of the Church, we are able to serve men and women, our peoples, and to penetrate their culture with the Gospel, to transform hearts, and to make systems and structures more human. Any form of silence, disregard, mutilation or inadequate emphasis of the whole of the Mystery of Jesus Christ that diverges from the Church’s faith cannot be the valid content of evangelization. “Today, under the pretext of a piety that is false, under the deceptive appearance of a preaching of the Gospel, some people are trying to deny the Lord Jesus,”29 wrote a great Bishop in the midst of the hard crises of the fourth century. And he added: “I speak the truth, so that the cause of the confusion that we are suffering may be known to all. I cannot keep silent.”30 Nor can you, the bishops of today, keep silent when this confusion occurs.

This is what Pope Paul VI recommended in his opening discourse at the Medellín Conference: “Talk, speak out, preach, write. United in purpose and in programme, defend and explain the truths of the faith by taking a position on the present validity of the Gospel, on questions dealing with the life of the faithful and the defence of Christian conduct”.31

I too will not grow weary of repeating, as my duty of evangelizing the whole of mankind obliges me to do: “Do not be afraid. Open wide the doors for Christ. To his saving power open the boundaries of States, economic and political systems, the vast fields of culture, civilization and development”32....

The truth that we owe to man is, first and foremost, a truth about man. As witnesses of Jesus Christ we are heralds, spokesmen and servants of this truth. We cannot reduce it to the principles of a system of philosophy or to pure political activity. We cannot forget it or betray it.

Perhaps one of the most obvious weaknesses of present-day civilization lies in an inadequate view of man. Without doubt, our age is the one in which

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28 See P a u l VI, Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi, Sections 19 and 27.
29 St. H i l a r y o f P o i t i e r s, Contra Auxentium, 1-4.
30 Ibidem.
man has been most written and spoken of, the age of the forms of humanism and the age of anthropocentrism. Nevertheless it is paradoxically also the age of man’s deepest anxiety about his identity and his destiny, the age of man’s abasement to previously unsuspected levels, the age of human values trampled on as never before.

How is this paradox explained? We can say that it is the inexorable paradox of atheistic humanism. It is the drama of man being deprived of an essential dimension of his being, namely, his search for the infinite, and thus faced with having his being reduced in the worst way. The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes plumbs the depths of the problem when it says: “Only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light.”

Thanks to the Gospel, the Church has the truth about man. This truth is found in an anthropology that the Church never ceases to fathom more thoroughly and to communicate to others. The primordial affirmation of this anthropology is that man is God’s image and cannot be reduced to a mere portion of nature or a nameless element in the human city. This is the meaning of what Saint Irenaeus wrote: “Man’s glory is God, but the recipient of God’s every action, of his wisdom and of his power is man.”

I made particular reference to this irreplaceable foundation of the Christian concept of man in my Christmas Message: “Christmas is the feast of man.... Man is an object to be counted, something considered under the aspect of quantity.... Yet at the same time he is a single being, unique and unrepeatable ... somebody thought of and chosen from eternity, someone called and identified by his own name.”

Faced with so many other forms of humanism that are often shut in by a strictly economic, biological or psychological view of man, the Church has the right and the duty to proclaim the Truth about man that she received from her teacher, Jesus Christ. God grant that no external compulsion may prevent her from doing so. God grant, above all, that she may not cease to do so through fear of doubt, through having let herself be contaminated by other forms of humanism, or through lack of confidence in her original message.

When a Pastor of the Church proclaims clearly and unambiguously the Truth about man that was revealed by him who “knew what was in man” (Jn 2:25), he must therefore be encouraged by the certainty of doing the best service to the human being.

This complete truth about the human being constitutes the foundation of the Church’s social teaching and the basis also of true liberation. In the light of this truth, man is not a being subjected to economic or political processes; these processes are instead directed to man and are subjected to him....

33 Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes, Section 22.
34 See ibidem, Sections 12 and 14.
Those familiar with the Church’s history know that in all periods there have been admirable Bishops deeply involved in advancing and valiantly defending the human dignity of those entrusted to them by the Lord. They have always been impelled to do so by their episcopal mission, because they considered human dignity a Gospel value that cannot be despised without greatly offending the Creator.

This dignity is infringed on the individual level when due regard is not had for values such as freedom, the right to profess one’s religion, physical and mental integrity, the right to essential goods, to life.... It is infringed on the social and political level when man cannot exercise his right of participation, or when he is subjected to unjust and unlawful coercion, or submitted to physical or mental torture....

If the Church makes herself present in the defence of, or in the advancement of, man, she does so in line with her mission, which, although it is religious and not social or political, cannot fail to consider man in the entirety of his being. The Lord outlined in the parable of the Good Samaritan the model of attention to all human needs (cf. Lk 10:29-37), and he said that in the final analysis he will identify himself with the dispossessed—the sick, the imprisoned, the hungry, the lonely—who have been given a helping hand (Mt 25:31-46). The Church has learned in these and other pages of the Gospel (cf. Mk 6:35-44) that her evangelizing mission has, as an essential part, action for justice and the tasks of the advancement of man,37 and that between evangelization and human advancement there are very strong links of the orders of anthropology, theology and love38; so that “evangelization would not be complete if it did not take into account the unceasing interplay of the Gospel and of man’s concrete life, both personal and social”39.

Let us also keep in mind that the Church’s action in earthly matters such as human advancement, development, justice, the rights of the individual, is always intended to be at the service of man; and of man as she sees him in the Christian vision of the anthropology that she adopts. She therefore does not need to have recourse to ideological systems in order to love, defend and collaborate in the liberation of man: at the center of the message of which she is the depositary and herald she finds inspiration for acting in favor of brotherhood, justice, and peace, against all forms of domination, slavery, discrimination, violence, attacks on religious liberty and aggression against man, and whatever attacks life.40

It is therefore not through opportunism nor thirst for novelty that the Church, “the expert in humanity”41 defends human rights. It is through a true evangelical commitment, which, as happened with Christ, is a commitment to the most

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38 See P a u l VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi, Section 31.
39 Ibidem, Section 29.
40 See Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, Sections 26, 27 and 29.
needy. In fidelity to this commitment, the Church wishes to stay free with regard
to the competing systems, in order to opt only for man. Whatever the miseries
or sufferings that afflict man, it is not through violence, the interplay of power
and political systems, but through the truth concerning man, that he journeys
towards a better future.
Hence the Church’s constant preoccupation with the delicate question of prop-
erty. A proof of this is the writings of the Fathers of the Church through the first
thousand years of Christianity. It is clearly shown by the vigorous teaching of
Saint Thomas Aquinas, repeated so many times. In our own times, the Church
has appealed to the same principles in such far-reaching documents as the social
Encyclicals of the recent Popes. With special force and profundity, Pope Paul VI
spoke of this subject in his Encyclical.
This voice of the Church, echoing the voice of human conscience, and which
did not cease to make itself heard down the centuries in the midst of the most
varied social and cultural systems and conditions, deserves and needs to be
heard in our time also, when the growing wealth of a few parallels the growing
poverty of the masses.
It is then that the Church’s teaching, according to which all private property
involves a social obligation, acquires an urgent character. With respect to this
teaching, the Church has a mission to carry out; she must preach, educate
individuals and collectivities, form public opinion, and offer orientations to
the leaders of the peoples. In this way she will be working in favor of society,
within which this Christian and evangelical principle will finally bear the fruit
of a more just and equitable distribution of goods, not only within each nation
but also in the world in general, ensuring that the stronger countries do not use
their power to the detriment of the weaker ones.
Those who bear responsibility for the public life of the States and nations will
have to understand that internal peace and international peace can only be
ensured if a social and economic system based on justice flourishes.
Christ did not remain indifferent in the face of this vast and demanding im-
perative of social morality. Nor could the Church. In the spirit of the Church,
which is the spirit of Christ, and relying upon her ample and solid doctrine, let
us return to work in this field.
It must be emphasized here once more that the Church’s solicitude looks to
the whole man.
For this reason, for an economic system to be just it is an indispensable condi-
tion that it should favor the development and diffusion of public education
and culture. The more just the economy, the deeper will be the conscience of
culture. This is very much in line with what the Council stated: that to attain
a life worthy of man, it is not possible to limit oneself to having; one must
aspire to being more.

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43 See P a u l VI, Encyclical Populorum Progressio, Sections 23-24; see also J o h n XXIII,
Encyclical Mater et Magistra, Section 106.
44 See Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, Section 35.
Therefore, Brothers, drink at these authentic fountains. Speak with the language of the Council, of John XXIII, of Paul VI: it is the language of the experience, of the suffering, of the hope of modern humanity.

When Paul VI declared that development is “the new name of peace” he had in mind all the links of interdependence that exist not within the nations but also outside them, on the world level. He took into consideration the mechanisms that, because they happen to be imbued not with authentic humanism but with materialism, produce on the international level rich people ever more rich at the expense of poor people ever more poor.

There is no economic rule capable of changing these mechanisms by itself. It is necessary, in international life, to call upon ethical principles, the demands of justice, the primary commandment which is that of love. Primacy must be given to what is moral, to what is spiritual, to what springs from the full truth concerning man.

I have wished to manifest to you these reflections which I consider very important, although they must not distract you from the central theme of the Conference: we shall reach man, we shall reach justice, through evangelization.

In the face of what has been said hitherto, the Church sees with deep sorrow “the sometimes massive increase of human rights violations in all parts of society and of the world. Who can deny that today individual persons and civil powers violate basic rights of the human person with impunity: rights such as the right to be born, right to life, the right to responsible procreation, to work, to peace, to freedom and social justice, the right to participate in the decisions that affect people and nations? And what can be said when we face the various forms of collective violence like discrimination against individuals and groups, the use of physical and psychological torture perpetrated against prisoners or political dissenters? The list grows when we turn to the instances of the abduction of persons for political reasons and look at the acts of kidnapping for material gain which attack so dramatically family life, the social fabric.”

We cry out once more: Respect man! He is the image of God! Evangelize, so that this may become a reality; so that the Lord may transform hearts and humanize the political and economic systems, with man’s responsible commitment as the starting point!

Pastoral commitment in this field must be encouraged through a correct Christian idea of liberation. The Church feels the duty to proclaim the liberation of millions of human beings, the duty to help this liberation become firmly established; but she also feels the corresponding duty to proclaim liberation in its integral and profound meaning, as Jesus proclaimed and realized it. “Liberation from everything that oppresses man but which is, above all, liberation from sin and the Evil One, in the joy of knowing God and being known by him.”

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45 Paul VI, *Populorum Progressio*, Section 76.
48 See ibidem, Section 31.
49 Ibidem, Section 9.
Liberation made up of reconciliation and forgiveness. Liberation springing from the reality of being children of God, whom we are able to call Abba, Father (Rom 8:15); a reality which makes us recognize in every man a brother of ours, capable of being transformed in his heart through God’s mercy. Liberation that, with the energy of love, urges us towards fellowship, the summit and fullness of which we find in the Lord. Liberation as the overcoming of the various forms of slavery and man-made idols, and as the growth of the new man. Liberation that in the framework of the Church’s proper mission is not reduced to the simple and narrow economic, political, social or cultural dimension, and is not sacrificed to the demands of any strategy, practice or short-term solution.50

To safeguard the originality of Christian liberation and the energies that it is capable of releasing, one must at all costs avoid any form of curtailment or ambiguity, as Pope Paul VI asked: “The Church would lose her fundamental meaning. Her message of liberation would no longer have any originality and would easily be open to monopolization and manipulation by ideological systems and political parties.”51 There are many signs that help to distinguish when the liberation in question is Christian and when on the other hand it is based rather on ideologies that rob it of consistency with an evangelical view of man, of things and of events.52 They are signs drawn from the content of what the evangelizers proclaim or from the concrete attitudes that they adopt. At the level of content, one must see what is their fidelity to the word of God, to the Church’s living Tradition and to her Magisterium. As for attitudes, one must consider what sense of communion they have with the Bishops, in the first place, and with the other sectors of the People of God; what contribution they make to the real building up of the community; in what form they lovingly show care for the poor, the sick, the dispossessed, the neglected and the oppressed, and in what way they find in them the image of the poor and suffering Jesus, and strive to relieve their need and serve Christ in them.53 Let us not deceive ourselves: the humble and simple faithful, as though by an evangelical instinct, spontaneously sense when the Gospel is served in the Church and when it is emptied of its content and is stifled with other interests.

As you see, the series of observations made by Evangelii Nuntiandi on the theme of liberation retains all its validity. What we have already recalled constitutes a rich and complex heritage, which Evangelii Nuntiandi calls the Social Doctrine or Social Teaching of the Church.54 This teaching comes into being, in the light of the Word of God and the authentic Magisterium, from the presence of Christians in the midst of the changing situations of the world, in contact with the challenges that result from those situations. This social doctrine involves therefore both principles for reflection and also norms for judgment and guidelines for action.55

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50 See ibidem, Section 33.
51 Ibidem, Section 32.
52 See ibidem, Section 35.
53 See Second Vatican Council, Lumen Genium, Section 8.
54 See P a u l VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi, Section 38.
55 See P a u l VI, Apostolic Letter Octogesima Adveniens, Section 4.
Placing responsible confidence in this social doctrine—even though some people seek to sow doubts and lack of confidence in it—to give it serious study, to try to apply it, to teach it, to be faithful to it: all this is the guarantee, in a member of the Church, of his commitment in the delicate and demanding social tasks, and of his efforts in favor of the liberation or advancement of his brothers and sisters. Allow me therefore to recommend to your special pastoral attention the urgent need to make your faithful people aware of this social doctrine of the Church. Particular care must be given to forming a social conscience at all levels and in all sectors. When injustices grow worse and the distance between rich and poor increases distressingly, the social doctrine, in a form which is creative and open to the broad fields of the Church’s presence, must be a valuable instrument for formation and action. This holds good particularly for the laity: “It is to the laity, though not exclusively to them, that secular duties and activity properly belong.”56 It is necessary to avoid supplanting the laity and to study seriously just when certain forms of supplying for them retain their reason for existence. Is it not the laity who are called, by reason of their vocation in the Church, to make their contribution in the political and economic dimensions, and to be effectively present in the safeguarding and advancement of human rights?

Keywords: evangelization, Latin America, adequate anthropology, humanism, atheistic humanism, anthropocentrism, human dignity, freedom, right of participation, human rights, freedom, violence, liberation, social teaching of the Church

Extracts from the Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Third General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate, Puebla de Los Angeles, Mexico, 28 January 1979.

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Witold P. GLINKOWSKI – Suffering as a Paradigm of Tischner’s Philosophy of Drama DOI 10.12887/31-2018-2-122-03

The aim of the article is to indicate that suffering and pain are important categories in Józef Tischner’s philosophy of drama. In the philosophy of drama, which in this case is the philosophy of man, man is considered a subject defining

56 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, Section 43.
himself in the horizon of good and evil. Human understanding of good is crucial here because man’s goal is to make his life valuable. Human life is defined as “thinking according to values,” in a broad sense of the term. Life understood this way runs in the context of axiological experiences. Without the experience of evil, man would be incapable of opening himself to goodness or of choosing goodness. However, evil is not the same as suffering. Evil poses a threat of the drama of man’s existence becoming a tragedy. However, evil, as opposed to suffering, has no power over man, because it involves man’s consent. In addition, suffering belongs to the monologic reality, while evil belongs to the dialogical and interpersonal reality. The difference between evil and suffering provides the foundation of Tischner’s philosophy of drama, in which man turns out to be a free and responsible subject.

Keywords: Józef Tischner, suffering, pain, philosophy of drama, good and evil, thinking according to values, subjectivity, responsibility

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Marek SZULAKIEWICZ – The Human Being Facing Wrongs: Between homo explorens and homo rapiens

Wrongs, those experienced and those done to others, are inherent in the drama of human existence. A philosophical debate on wrongdoing and wrong done usually involves deliberations on issues such as sin, blame, evil and forgiveness, focusing on the condition wrongs introduce, on the way they are experienced, or on their consequences. The present article, however, is an attempt to approach the issue of ‘wrong’ in terms other than those characteristic of moral philosophy or ethics. The author addresses the following questions: What actually happens when a wrong has been done? What is the essence of being a wrongdoer (homo rapiens)? What happens to the world, to being as such, and to human beings once a wrong has been done? What kind of relation between the wrongdoer and the world does a wrong reveal? The above questions about the nature of wrongs and wrongdoing do not fit in the area of ethics, rather, they signal and call for a metaphysical approach. The problem of the metaphysics of the wrong comes fully—and dramatically—to light once we consider how wrongs affect human beings, those harmed and those unharmed by them, and—last but not least—being as such. In these ramifications, it does not suffice to see wrongs merely as evil or undeserved harm. Evil and suffering are by no means the only aspects of a wrong. A metaphysical analysis shows that its nature lies in diminishing everything that is important, significant and elevating. A metaphysical
‘reading’ of wrongs prompts the following hypothesis: A wrong results from an action (or an activity) of a human being who introduces a change detrimental to the world. One may point to three aspects of human action that results in wrongdoing, and, consequently, to three areas of being affected by wrongdoing. Firstly, wrongdoing is an action directed against the subject who commits it. Secondly, it is an action directed against another human being (or other human beings). Thirdly, it is an action directed against the entire reality (or being). In undertaking the issue of ‘wrong’ it is crucial to address firstly the problem of the human being as such, since it is the human being that wrongs affect in the first instance. Therefore a rightful attempt to comprehend wrongs involves, above all, an insight into anthropology rather than an analysis of human actions and their consequences.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: wrong, homo explorens, homo rapiens, self-harm, harming others, harming the world

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Filip KOBIELA – “I shall dance on your graves yet!” On the Essence and Types of Schadenfreude
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This paper primarily examines the essence of Schadenfreude, which is a pleasure derived by someone from another person’s misfortune, which they, however, have not caused themselves. While capturing this essence we should distinguish four principal dimensions: emotional, locality related, axiological and causal. I employ these dimensions to construct a certain combination of emotional reactions to the values and, against this background, it is possible to expose the specificity of Schadenfreude as well as some of the relationships occurring between Schadenfreude and other emotions. I then present a certain typology of Schadenfreude (comic, prudential, related to justice, jealousy, profits, grace and radical) accompanied by brief ethical analyses. In the conclusion, I also discuss the point of view of the Schadenfreude victim, including deliberately giving a reason for others to feel Schadenfreude.

Keywords: Schadenfreude, joy, evil, envy, justice
 Wojciech LEWANDOWSKI – Do We Have a Right to Forgive on Behalf of Others?  
DOI 10.12887/31-2018-2-122-06

The right to forgive on behalf of others is an inseparable element of modern concepts of forgiveness. At the same time, the attempt to apply the conditions of an individual direct forgiveness to forgiveness given by a certain community on behalf of its members constitutes a serious theoretical challenge. In this article I present an analysis of the possibility of applying reasons for individual forgiveness on behalf of others in order to justify social forgiveness. In the first part I present two interpretations of forgiveness: as a restoration of impartiality and as a restoration of positive partiality. In the second part I formulate the concept of the individual surrogate forgiveness along with an analysis of reasons that could justify it. The third part comprises an indication of the limits of application of these reasons to social forgiveness.

Keywords: surrogate forgiveness, political forgiveness, social forgiveness, pseudo-forgiveness

Fr. Romuald JAWORSKI – Between Hurt and Reconciliation: Reflections on Harm and Forgiveness  
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The article comprises an analysis of the phenomenon of harm conceived of as a multifarious mental experience embracing the spheres of emotions, intellect, and decision making. The author also points to the relation between the subjective feeling of having been wronged and the spiritual sense of the goal of life and the purpose of suffering.

The feeling that comes to the foreground in the experience of harm, or wrong, is that of having been treated unjustly. Yet one needs to distinguish actual harm from the subjective feeling of having been wronged, the latter being not always
adequate to the actual harm that has been done to the person in question. In a discussion of the various manifestations of the experience of harm and of its complex symptomatology the feelings and psychological traits of the wrong-doers as well as those of the wronged ones must be considered. The paper, however, does not analyse merely psychological aspects of the experience of harm, but it points to the relation of the experience in question to the spiritual sphere, which comprises the concept of the purpose and meaning of suffering and of its religious significance.

In the second part of the article, strategies of dealing with harm, or wrong, have been discussed, in particular the determinants, causes and stages of the experience of having been harmed, or wronged. Against this background the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation has been emphasized: they are effective strategies that help in healing the ‘wound’ an experience of harm opens. The concluding part of the paper comprises some practical suggestions as to ways of dealing with the experience of harm, or wrong.

Keywords: harm, wrong, experience of being harmed, wrongdoer, the wronged one, the process of forgiveness, wrong and religion

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Karolina ROZMARYNOWSKA – Why Words Hurt: On the Essence of Linguistic Harm

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The subject of the present article is the nature and source of linguistic harm. The study shows a relation obtaining between two areas, namely: (1) the ethical significance of harm and (2) the performativity of language. Thus the goal of the analyses is to explain how one can harm another simply by using words. The main question concerns the possibility and the determinants of doing harm by means of words. In order to address this question the authoress explains the ethical significance of harm, distinguishes its emotional side from the factual one, and reflects on the role of intention in harm-doing, as well as on its effects. Then she points out the difference, on the one hand between a linguistic act and speech and on the other hand between a linguistic act and physical action. She also attempts to determine what statements have a hurtful power and what the source of this power is. In her reflections, she refers to the classical concepts of speech acts coined by John L. Austin and John Searle. According to these authors, side by side with constative statements, there exist performative statements, which have a causative power. Thus hurting with words is possible, because by using language we not only describe the reality, but also change it.
Marek SZYMANSKI – Western Buddhism and Social Oppression
DOI 10.12887/31-2018-2-122-09

The number of Buddhists and that of the followers of Buddhism have strikingly increased in the West in the last decades. The characteristics of Western Buddhism include: the individualism and equality of its adherents, their common interest in meditation, a rationalistic attitude, the ideal of social justice, reverence for nature and universalism. Western Buddhism is strongly influenced by the values of Western societies and so clearly differs from traditional Buddhism. The counterparts of Western Buddhism in Asiatic Buddhism are the modernistic trends that arose as a result of Western colonial culture impact. David L. McMahan convincingly argues that Western Buddhism is a hybrid formation and cannot be explained without taking into account the impact of the Reformation, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and Romanticism. Western Buddhists pay a great deal of attention to human rights and sources of social injustice. Elimination of social injustice is often believed to be a moral duty and part of religious practice. Such an attitude is a distinctive feature of so-called engaged Buddhism. In traditional Buddhism, social oppression and the suffering it generated were treated as natural and fair repayment for previous faults. So, traditionally, compassion was not tantamount to a duty to modify the social structure. That was changed in engaged Buddhism, wherein social oppression was interpreted as wrongness. The development of engaged Buddhism is a good example of intercultural interaction and global trends. The Buddhist model of activity directed towards social justice was created in Asia under the influence of Western social philosophy and afterward dominated Western Buddhism, which now affects Asian Buddhist traditions in reverse.

Keywords: Western Buddhism, engaged Buddhism, social oppression, interdependence

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Non-human animals are ubiquitous in our lives and receive various treatment from humans. Some of them enjoy the status of pets and are surrounded with love and care, while others are considered as pests, and thus exterminated or mistreated. There are also animals used in industrial farming and killed for meat and skins; others are used for medical experiments so that new cures for illnesses can be found; still others are used for amusement or entertainment. Despite the interactions between humans and animals relations between the human being and other species have been examined by psychologists only for a short time now. The present article comprises a survey of the psychological research on speciesism, a phenomenon widely discussed by philosophers, but still relatively new to psychology, although this discipline makes it possible to empirically verify the intellectual constructs provided by the humanities.

The tendency to social categorization—classifying humans and other animals into groups—affects the way we perceive others. If we perceive members of our own group as unique individuals who share merely few traits, whereas we tend to believe members of a stranger-group to be alike in the respect of their characteristic traits, we inevitably favor our own group and consider it as ‘better,’ simultaneously homogenizing the stranger-group, developing a bias against it, discriminating it, and using stereotypes in thinking and talking about it. For years, intelligence, the use of language and certain emotions were considered as traits distinguishing human beings from non-humans. Yet the growth of the knowledge of the traits and abilities of other species makes us revisit these aspects, as well as the issue of the relations between humans and other animals.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: speciesism, intergroup relations, comparative psychology, empirical psychology

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In his literary works Fyodor Dostoevsky describes states of psychic closure, alienated being and feeling hurt. He penetrates dark, perverted areas of human nature, in which both being harmed and harming others are connected not only with suffering, but also with delight. The author of Humiliated and Insulted asks whether it is possible to accept injustice and transform it into compassion, whether it is possible to transgress the situation in which the harmed one becomes the one who harms, takes revenge, lasts in the hell of self-torture, or commits suicide. In his vision of injustice, the writer often transgresses social, psychological, or moral order to look at the problem from a religious, eschatological perspective. Protagonists of the novel of the author of Crime and Punishment question not only whether (and how) it is possible to forgive someone who hurt them—they also ask about the love of Christ that embraces both victims and evildoers. By raising the issue of punishment and hell, they ask about the Justice of God, salvation and hope for final peace between a victim and an evildoer.

Keywords: Dostoevsky, injustice, forgiveness, hell, Christ, the Last Judgment

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The article presents some chosen aspects of the problems of evildoing and forgiveness as they appear in the works of Czesław Miłosz and Zbigniew Herbert. The analytical and interpretational reflection is focused on the presence and particular manifestations of these motifs in their poetry. The meanings and conceptual constructs present in their poems are referred to the metaliterary writings of the two poets, in particular to the essays they authored. The paper comprises the following parts: “‘Wrong’ as the Keyword,” “Facing the Twentieth Century: ‘A New Experience’ of Wrong and Forgiveness,” “To Find the Middle Point,” “The Wronged Ones and the Wrongdoers,” and “The Paradoxes of Forgiveness.” The paper offers interpretational solutions regarding various aspects of the categories relevant to the main theme of the analysis, and it attempts to show the most important artistic means employed by the poets, who attempt to find the best possible style of expression of the complex dialectics.
between wrongdoing and forgiveness and, consequently, to articulate a ‘new,’
twentieth-century experience of such affects, processes, and states.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: wrong, forgiveness, Zbigniew Herbert, Czesław Miłosz, poetics
of experience

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Ireneusz ŁUĆ – The Archaeology of Attrition Warfare: The Galilean War of Vespasian
and Titus (May–November, 67 A.D.)

In order to effectively pacify the land of Galilee, the Romans made very careful
preparations for their military campaign. The forms of Roman military activ-
ity follow a certain pattern. Vespasian did not begin such a campaign without
receiving the information about the location and the military potential of the
Jewish rebels.

Having entered Galilee, the Romans used their traditional tactics of the so-called
‘marching camps,’ not to mention taking over some of the towns as permanent
military bases. During the main campaign in Galilee—and certainly since the
winter break from 67 to 68 AD—following Vespasian’s orders, soldiers from
his army began to deploy military garrisons in designated Jewish towns and
villages. In turn, the Romans deployed units of up to one hundred soldiers (cen-
turies) commanded by centurions. The Romans deployed civilians of the Jewish
land in other occupied towns, especially after the second phase of operations in
Galilee (August–November 67 AD). It is possible that from the moment of the
Roman invasion of Galilee, the duty of soldiers from the expeditionary army/
force of Vespasian was not only to requisition of all movable goods, but also
to confiscate the buildings and take over the Jewish land.

The Galilean campaign is an example of the so-called attrition warfare. By
treating the inhabitants of Galilee so cruelly, the Romans wanted to punish them
for supporting the Jewish rebels.

In order to effectively break their resistance, Vespasian sent off the soldiers of
several formations who used various types of weapons in combat. The exhaust-
ing fights were felt by the Romans themselves. Vespasian and his soldiers also
had to relieve stress tension after what they had witnessed. The loss of people on
the Roman side could also be significant, although Josephus Flavius mentioned
it very generally. Therefore, before the commencement of the summer–autumn
operation in Galilee (August 67 AD) in Caesarea Philippi, Titus’s father ordered a twenty-day rest for his subordinates. He himself indulged in feasting and offered thanksgiving sacrifices to ‘God’ for the achieved success, which was recorded by Josephus Flavius. Taking control of Galilee was the first step that opened the way for an attack on Jerusalem itself.

Keywords: First Jewish Revolt, Nero’s personnel policy, Vespasian’s promotion, Roman strategy and military tactics during the Galilean War

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Dobromila NOWICKA – Towards the Concept of Compensation: On the Evolution of the Understanding of ‘Injure’ in the Roman Law
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The object of the author’s consideration is the Roman concept of injure (iniuria), analyzed through the prism of the regulations meant as protection from injure, or, in the case of harm actually done, as the grounds for compensation demand. Since the Roman law unquestionably stipulated that compensation be paid merely for injured property, and it did not have a concept of ‘injury’ other than that done to property, the author analyzes the issue of ‘injure’ based on the essence of the delict of iniuria, considered as a forbidden action, which, however, was not associated with injury done to property. The author reconstructs the evolution of the legal regulations regarding this issue and, drawing on them, proposes some conclusions as to the approach to injure, or harm, in the Roman law.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: iniuria, contumelia, dignitas, injury, harm, reverence, dignity, physical integrity

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Magdalena WILEJCZYK – Harm, Forgiveness, Compensation: Legal and Ethical Perspective


Harm, forgiveness and compensation are the fundamental legal and moral categories. The meaning of these concepts in ethics is usually more extensive than that of those used in legal sciences. The legislator, trying to respect fundamental ethical recommendations and basic moral beliefs of the society, is not able to fully implement these concepts on the legal grounds. This is partly due to the difficulty in proving certain categories of injustices, partly due to the lack of adequate legal instruments to compensate, and partly also because many events and life situations can only have a blurred moral qualification, resulting from the lack of a fully unambiguous moral evaluation of some phenomena. As a result, the legal limitations of the category of harm, forgiveness and compensation consist mainly in the fact that these terms are normative in the legal system, which means that only non-material damage as a result of violating any of the personal rights is recognized by law, forgiveness has legal meaning only in those situations, in which the legislator provided for it (donation, disinheritance, unworthiness of inheritance), and the claim for the strictly understood financial compensation for the harm suffered is available only in the event of violation of any of the personal rights.

Keywords: harm, forgiveness, compensation, relations between the law and ethics, categories of harms, normativity, material and non-material damage, personal rights, donation, disinheritance, unworthiness of inheritance, financial compensation

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Mariusz ZEMŁO – Facing the ‘Stranger’: Opinions of Białystok Post-Elementary Schools Students on Harmful Behaviors

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This article presents the opinions of students attending post-elementary schools in Białystok (Poland) towards selected harmful behaviors. Among these behaviors, national-ethnic discrimination, religious discrimination, racism, and homophobia were taken into consideration. In the presentation, apart from the borderline results, the following independent variables were taken into account: gender, type of school, the average grade obtained by pupils, the mother’s social and professional group, and self-declaration of faith. The basis for the presentation is the results of the research conducted in October–December 2015, in which 2028 people participated.
Abstracts

Keywords: sociology of morality, national-ethnic discrimination, religious discrimination, racism, homosexualism

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Monika BADOWSKA-HODYR – Towards Reintegration: The Family, as seen in the Light of Individualized Penal Treatment of Persons Serving Long-Term Sentences
DOI 10.12887/31-2018-2-122-17

The article sums up a research project carried out among persons serving long-term sentences and, simultaneously, parents of children under fifteen years of age. The project was run in penitentiary institutions in Poland and in the Czech Republic. The author analyzed the most important fields of penitentiary work with a view to individualized penal treatment of the inmates. She pointed out the significance of factors such as the structure of the meaning of life, the distress caused by isolation and confinement, and the role of the family in the process of resocialization. The empirical material gathered throughout the research enabled identification of the areas in need of intense and complex actions, which may significantly contribute to the creation of a coherent system of support aimed at persons serving long-term sentences. A system of this kind might, as a result, strengthen the individual’s inner need for a worthy, authentic and responsible life once the person in question has served his or her term.

Keywords: family, corrective justice, principle of individualization, confinement, meaning of life, inmates serving long-term sentences

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Kazimierz KRAJEWSKI – The Integrity of Moral Experience, as seen by Tadeusz Styczew, and the Idea of Ethics as the First Philosophy

The article aims to show that a logical conclusion following from Tadeusz Styczew’s concept of the ‘integrity of moral experience’ is that ethics should be considered as the ‘first philosophy.’ In his works, Styczew actually worked out two concepts of integral moral experience. In the first of them, characteristic of his early writings, he points to the experience of the categorical duty to affirm a human person on
the grounds of the person’s inborn dignity. Styczeń’s second (later) concept of the integrity of moral experience draws in turn on the experience, accomplished in a cognitive act, of the normative power of truth as ultimately revealing the dignity of the cognitive subject and holding him (her) responsible for himself (herself) as a witness to truth and, simultaneously, as one to whom truth has been entrusted. In his early concept of the integrity of moral experience, Styczeń recognizes that the content of a categorical duty, as well as its binding power, is inextricably connected to the dignity of the human subject at whom the given action is directed. In his later concept of the integrity of moral experience, he in turn holds that the integrity in question is revealed in the fact that the experience of the normative power of truth results in moral self-constitution of a human person (a moral subject). A close connection between anthropology and ethics is the reason why Styczeń describes ethics as ‘normative anthropology.’ A deeper analysis of the experience of the normative power of truth shows, however, that while this experience is the basic one analyzed by ethics, it simultaneously provides experiential basis for epistemology, anthropology, and metaphysics, and thus for the main branches of philosophy. The experience of the normative power of truth demands an epistemological reflection (which points to a close connection between ethics and epistemology), which results in self-constitution of a person as both a witness to truth and one to whom truth has been entrusted (which points to a close connection between ethics and anthropology), at the same time underscoring the actual reality of the being of both the one who makes the cognitive act in question and of what this person confirms with his (her) cognitive act (which points to a close connection between ethics and metaphysics). Therefore the description of ethics as ‘first philosophy’ is well-grounded. Moreover, ethics discovers the ultimate meaning of human existence in the person’s moral fulfillment, or, in other words, in the person’s affirmation of the truth about him (her). Therefore while—in the epistemological and methodological dimension—ethics must be considered as philosophia prima, it becomes philosophia ultima in the anthropological (‘personological’) order.

Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

Keywords: the integrity of experience, the experience of the duty to affirm a human person, the experience of the normative power of truth, the person’s dignity, a witness to truth and one to whom truth has been entrusted, self-constitution of the person, anthropology of morality, metaphysics of morality, normative anthropology, ethics as philosophia prima, ethics as philosophia ultima

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Abstracts
The paper analyzes Tadeusz Styczeń’s conception of ethics as both an empirical and a normative scholarly discipline. The empirical character of ethics is secured by the experience of the binding power of truth, and the binding power of truth is the source of the normative character of ethics. The starting point for developing this conception is the problem of inferring ‘ought’ propositions from ‘is’ propositions. Styczeń agrees with David Hume that there is no valid logical inference between the two kinds of propositions; yet he claims that this fact does not constitute a problem for ethics, for what matters for ethics is not logical connections between propositions but the experience which grasps factual and necessary connections between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ aspects of beings. An instance of this kind of experience is that of the binding power of truth, expressed by means of the following statement: “I must not deny what I have recognized as true.” The experience in question is significant both for ethics and anthropology, as it provides information about a particular state of affairs (and about the cognitive subject being the source of this information), as well as it generates the imperative for the cognitive subject to affirm and love truth for its own sake. Thus ethics turns out to be normative anthropology. The analysis of Styczeń’s conception leads to the conclusion that, so understood, ethics fulfills the basic methodological and epistemic requirements for a scholarly discipline. Therefore it holds true that normativity does not preclude the scholarly character of ethics. Yet the experience of the binding power of truth is theoretically laden at least in the following sense: it is grasped in a certain language and it assumes some background knowledge (for example, a knowledge of the existence of the human nature or that of the essential rationality of the human being). However, such assumptions are not a problem for ethics, as it shares this feature with other empirical disciplines, for instance physics. As it is demonstrated in the paper, while it is possible to build ethics on experience, justification of its theses ultimately involves a reference to metaphysics—and this is why removing normative ethics (both ethics as such and applied ethics) from the edifice of philosophy would be a misguided move.

Keywords: normativity of ethics, the binding power of truth, the starting point of ethics, ethics as a scholarly discipline, rationality, integrity of philosophy

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Fr. Alfred M. WIERZBICKI – Is the Experience of Truth Sufficient for Building Ethics as a Theory of Moral Duty?
DOI 10.12887/31-2018-2-122-20

This article is a comment on Tadeusz Styczeń’s study “Etyka jako antropologia normatywna” [“Ethics as Normative Anthropology”] and it is a contribution to the debate held among his disciples who want to develop his conception of the normative power of truth. The ‘veritative’ interpretation of personalism, outlined in Styczeń’s later writings, is a particularization and a specification of its ‘dignitative’ interpretation worked out by Karol Wojtyła and developed by Styczeń himself in his early ethical writings. The dignity of the human person is the source of moral obligation. This principle follows from the fact that the principal manifestation of the dignity of the person is his (her) ability to know truth. Styczeń claims that self-information is self-imperative and that the subject becomes ‘a trustee of truth,’ and at the same time ‘a trustee of a trustee of truth,’ or, of any person capable of recognizing truth on the grounds of his (her) rationality. The author of the present paper poses the question of whether the experience of the normative power of truth is as universal as the experience of the dignity of the person. He also points out that in order to achieve a complete ethical theory one should consider the axiological structure of the reality and therefore normativity is a property of the truth about good.

Keywords: person, dignity, normativity, truth, good

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Piotr DUCHLIŃSKI – Personalistic Ethics and the Image of the World: Around Tadeusz Styczeń’s Article “Etyka jako antropologia normatywna” [“Ethics as Normative Anthropology”]
DOI 10.12887/31-2018-2-122-21

The author aims to reconstruct the image of the world underlying Tadeusz Styczeń’s concept of ethics. The reconstruction is based on Styczeń’s views expressed in his article “Etyka jako antropologia normatywna”[“Ethics as Normative Anthropology”], originally published in 1996. The author uses the categories developed in the contemporary philosophy of science, such as the image of the world, the epistemic framework, or the paradigm. He argues that Styczeń
accepted the Aristotelian-Thomistic image of the world containing specific metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological presuppositions. In addition, the author offers metalevel observations on the role of the scientific image of the world in ethics and the necessity to confront personalistic ethics with that image. He claims that since the image of the world is of the same character as the accepted paradigm, its choice involves an acceptance of the related cognitive values, tradition and worldview. The image of the world adopted by a given thinker follows from his or her education, tradition, and worldview, as well as from his or her faith in a specific paradigm of philosophizing.

Translated by Patrycja Mikulska

Keywords: personalistic ethics, maximalist ethics, minimalist ethics, neuroethics, image of the world, common sense image of the world, philosophical image of the world, scientific image of the world, classical philosophy, philosophy of science, interpretationism, paradigm, cognitive values

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Ewa PODREZ – Thoroughly Humanistic Ethics: Some Remarks Concerning Tadeusz Styczeń’s Article “Etyka jako antropologia normatywna” [“Ethics as Normative Anthropology”]


In my short paper I intend to draw a vast panorama of ethical issues and problems that directly or indirectly follow from the paper by Tadeusz Styczeń “Etyka jako antropologia normatywna” [“Ethics as Normative Anthropology”], a very important and inspiring work for ethical and metaethical reflection in Poland. However, Styczeń’s article raises doubts and objections concerning both the manner of constructing ethics he proposed and the normative content of such ethics. What is the source of moral truth and of the truth about ethics? How to understand an ethical category of the person? It is also worthwhile to reflect on how Styczeń’s ethics should be developed, which is a task, above all, of his disciples. What future research directions should be followed, what problems are to be addressed and how to connect different aspects of ethics with the contemporary humanities? Considered at this level, ethics is not only a kind
of philosophical knowledge, but it also points to the ethoses conceived of as models of ethical living, acting, and thinking.

Translated by Patrycja Mikulska

Keywords: metaethics, ethics, truth, anthropology, norm, person, subject, existence

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Fr. Marcin FERDYNUS – Abandoning Persistent Therapy: The Problem of Refusal to Use the Tracheostomy Ventilation by Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (The Perspective of the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae)

DOI 10.12887/31-2018-2-122-23

The article aims at answering the question whether a patient with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) can refuse the tracheostomy ventilation. The reference point for the conducted analyzes is, on the one hand, the definition of persistent therapy provided by John Paul II in his Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae, and, on the other, the interpretation of this definition proposed by the author of the article. The analyses conducted in the text have shown that a patient with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis can refuse tracheostomy ventilation and that his decision will be morally acceptable. The doctor should respect the patient’s decision and should he (she) disregard it, he (she) will harm the patient.

Keywords: persistent therapy, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), Evangelium Vitae

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From a Poetry Evening to the Visual Stage of the Catholic University of Lublin: Adam FITAS Talks to Professor Stefan SAWICKI

Adam Fitas talks to professor Stefan Sawicki about the difficult beginnings and the development of the academic and student theatre at the Catholic University of Lublin. The history of the academic theatre at the KUL dates back to the 1950’s. Started as a student stage, it evolved in time, and is today internationally known as Leszek Mądzik’s Visual Stage of the Catholic University of Lublin.

Keywords: Catholic University of Lublin, academic theatre, student theatre, censorship, catholic university, Visual Stage of the Catholic University of Lublin, Leszek Mądzik

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Katarzyna SZYMALA – A Burnout Community: From zoe to bios? Some Remarks Inspired by Byung-Chul Han’s Essay “The Burnout Society”

Review of Byung-Chul Han’s “Społeczeństwo zmęczenia” [“The Burnout Society”], transl. by Michał Sutowski (Krytyka Polityczna 45 (2017): 37-63).

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Kalina KUKIEŁKO-ROGOZIŃSKA – On the Philosophy of Marshall McLuhan


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Books recommended by *Ethos*


Mirosława CHUDA – A Fear of Leaping into the Well

A feuilleton addressing the growing phenomenon of cohabitation replacing marriage. The author refers to Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy in order to possible existential determinants of this phenomenon.

Keywords: marriage, cohabitation, love, Søren Kierkegaard

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Maria FILIPIAK – On Harm and Wrong


A bibliography of the addresses by John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis from 1978 to 2018.

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